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Abstract
This Note argues that without the finding of an agency or alter-ego relationship between a par-
ent and its subsidiary, the acts of a subsidiary cannot, under the doctrine of corporate separateness,
be attributed to a parent. Unless the acts of a subsidiary can be attributed to the parent, the exis-
tence of the parent-subsidiary relationship alone cannot supply the minimum contacts needed to
confer jurisdicition on a court over an alien parent. Part I of this Note will discuss the corporation
as a legal entity and the doctrine of corporate seperateness. After an examination of the pertinent
United States Supreme Court cases on the jurisdiction, an analysis of recent lower court cases on
parent and subsidiary corporations will follow in Part II. Part III will compare the statutory and
case law of the United Kingdom. Finally, Part IV will analyze whether the current movement in
the United States towards expanded jurisdiction is desirable in an international context.
JURISDICTION OVER ALIEN CORPORATIONS BASED
ON THE ACTIVITIES OF THEIR SUBSIDIARIES
IN THE FORUM: WHITHER THE
DOCTRINE OF CORPORATE SEPARATENESS?
INTRODUCTION
There are various bases for United States federal court ju-
risdiction to adjudicate over foreign corporations.' The asser-
1. Foreign corporations are corporations organized under the local law of a
state other than the forum state. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 42
comment a (1971) [hereinafter cited as RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICTS]. For the pur-
poses of this Note, a "foreign" defendant is either a citizen of, or if a corporation, is
incorporated in, or if an unincorporated association, has its principal place of busi-
ness in, one of the states in the United States, but not the forum state. An "alien"
defendant is a citizen of, or if a corporation, is incorporated in, or if an unincorpo-
rated association, has its principal place of business in, a nation other than the forum
nation.
A state has the power to exercise jurisdiction over a foreign corporation if the
relationship of the corporation to the state is such as to make the exercise of such
jurisdiction reasonable. Id. § 42(1). The RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICTS, lists the fol-
lowing as sufficient to support an exercise ofjurisdiction over a foreign corporation:
1) A state has power to exercise jurisdiction over a corporation that has con-
sented to the exercise of such jurisdiction. Id. § 43; cf In re Mid-Atlantic Toyota
Antitrust Litigation, 525 F. Supp. 1265, 1278, modified on other grounds, 541 F. Supp.
62 (D. Md. 1981) (consent statutes must incorporate the due process "minimum con-
tacts" requirement).
2) A state has power to exercise jurisdiction over a corporation that has ap-
pointed an agent to accept service of process in actions brought against the corpora-
tion in the state. RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICTS, supra, § 44; see, Pennsylvania Fire Ins.
Co. v. Gold Issue Mining & Milling Co., 243 U.S. 93 (1917).
3) A state has power to exercise jurisdiction over a corporation that has en-
tered an appearance as a defendant in the action. RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICTS, supra,
§ 45; see, e.g., Yale v. National Indem. Co., 602 F.2d 642, 645 (4th Cir. 1979).
4) A state has power to exercise jurisdiction over a corporation that has
brought an action in the state in that action, and, to the extent local law so provides,
in any action that the defendant may bring against it by way of counterclaim or cross-
action. RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICTS, supra, § 46; see Adam v. Saenger, 303 U.S. 59,
reh'g denied, 303 U.S. 666 (1938).
5) A state has power to exercise jurisdiction over a corporation that does busi-
ness in the state, with respect to causes of action arising from the business done in
the state. RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICTS, supra, § 47(1); see, e.g., Washington v. Norton
Mfg., Inc., 588 F.2d 441, 446-47 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 942 (1979). With
respect to causes of action that do not arise from the business done in the state, a
state has power to exercise jurisdiction when this business is so continuous and sub-
stantial that the state's exercise of such jurisdiction is reasonable. RESTATEMENT OF
CONFLICTS, supra, § 47(2); see, e.g., Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S.
437, reh'g denied, 343 U.S. 917 (1952); Bramam v. Mary Hitchcock Memorial Hosp.,
631 F.2d 6 (2d Cir. 1980). The RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICTS, defines doing business
as doing a series of similar acts for the purpose of realizing pecuniary profit, or other-
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tion ofjurisdiction over a defendant will be valid under the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment of the United
States Constitution 2 if the defendant has "certain minimum
wise accomplishing an objective, or doing a single act for such purpose with the in-
tention of initiating a series of such acts. RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICTS, supra, § 47
comment a.
6) A state has power to exercise jurisdiction when a corporation has done busi-
ness in the state but has ceased to do business there at the time when the action is
brought, when the action arises from the business done in the state. Id. § 48; see
Washington v. Superior Court, 289 U.S. 361 (1933).
7) A state has power to exercise jurisdiction when a corporation has done, or
has caused to be done, an act in the state, when the cause of action arising from the
act is in tort. RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICTS, supra, § 49(1); see, e.g., Elkhart Engineering
Corp. v. Dornier Werke, 343 F.2d 861 (5th Cir. 1965). With respect to any cause of
action not in tort arising from the act, a state may exercise jurisdiction unless the
nature of the act and of the corporation's relationship to the state makes the exercise
of such jurisdiction unreasonable. RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICTS, supra, § 49(2); see,
e.g., Sun First Nat'l Bank of Orlando v. Miller, 77 F.R.D. 430, 434 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
8) A state has power to exercise jurisdiction when a corporation has caused
effects in the state by an act done outside of the state, when the cause of action arises
from these effects, unless the nature of these effects and the corporation's relation-
ship to the state makes the exercise of such jurisdiction unreasonable. RESTATEMENT
OF CONFLICTS, supra, § 50; see, e.g., Mississippi Interstate Express, Inc. v. Transpo,
Inc., 681 F.2d 1003, 1112 (5th Cir. 1982).
9) A state has power to exercise jurisdiction over a corporation that has owned,
used or possessed an immovable thing in the state, when the cause of action arises
from the thing while it was owned, used or possessed by the corporation. RESTATE-
MENT OF CONFLICTS, supra, § 51(1); see, e.g., Leo v. Child, 304 F. Supp. 593, 595 (D.
Mass. 1969).
10) A state has power to exercise jurisdiction over a corporation that has
owned, used or possessed a chattel in the state, when the cause of action arises from
the chattel while it was in the state and was so owned, used or possessed, unless the
nature of the chattel and the corporation's relationship to the state make the exercise
of such jurisdiction unreasonable. RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICTS, supra, § 51(2); see,
e.g., Canterbury v. Monroe Lange Hardwood Imports, 48 N.C. App. 90, 92-93, 268
S.E.2d 868, 870-71 (1980).
11) A state has power to exercise jurisdiction over a corporation in other situa-
tions when the corporation has such a relationship to the state that it is reasonable
for the state to exercise such jurisdiction. RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICTS, supra, § 52.
As an example of such a relationship, the RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICTS addresses ju-
risdiction over a parent corporation in connection with the activities of its subsidiary.
Id. § 52 comment b. The RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICTS, states that jurisdiction over a
subsidiary corporation does not, in and of itself, give a state jurisdiction over the
parent, even though the parent owns all the stock of the subsidiary. Id.
For a discussion of the Supreme Court's interpretation of a "reasonable" exer-
cise ofjurisdiction, see infra notes 38-105 and accompanying text.
Although the RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICTS, addresses jurisdiction over "foreign"
corporations, the jurisdictional standards it sets forth are equally applicable to alien
corporations, which are afforded the same due process as domestic corporations. See
infra note 4.
2. The due process clause of the fourteenth amendment of the United States
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contacts with [the forum,] such that the maintenance of the suit
does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice.' "I The requirement of minimum contacts is especially
important in the case of an alien defendant, 4 because it is gen-
erally more difficult and inconvenient to defend a suit in a for-
eign nation than a foreign state.
5
Various United States courts disagree over whether the in-
corporation or business activities of a wholly-owned subsidiary
corporation in a forum constitutes sufficient minimum contacts
to give a court jurisdiction over an alien parent corporation.6
Constitution states that "[n]o State shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law .... U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
3. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (quoting
Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463, reh'g denied, 312 U.S. 712 (1940)).
4. The fifth and fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution pro-
tect alien persons from the deprivation of life, liberty or property without due pro-
cess of the law. U.S. CONST. amend. V, XIV, § 1; see Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 77
(1976); Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 530 (1954). For purposes of the fourteenth
amendment, corporations are considered to be "persons." See Metropolitan Life Ins.
Co. v. Ward, 105 S. Ct. 1676 (1985); First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S.
765, reh'g denied, 438 U.S. 907 (1978).
There is some disagreement as to how much due process aliens should be af-
forded under the United States Constitution. See Note, Jurisdiction Over Alien Corpora-
tions After Shaffer v. Heitner, 10 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 739, 753-55 n.91-96 and accompany-
ing text (1979). Nevertheless, there seems little doubt that, at least with respect to
jurisdictional issues, the due process clause applies even to aliens that are not present
within the United States. See, e.g., Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall,
446 U.S. 408 (1985), in which the United States Supreme Court held that the con-
tacts of a Colombian corporation with the forum state, Texas, were insufficient,
under the due process clause, to permit the courts of that state to assert jurisdiction
over it in an action unrelated to the corporation's activities in Texas. Id. at 418-19.
For a discussion of Helicopteros, see infra note 83.
5. See, e.g., Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Marina Salina Cruz, 649 F.2d 1266, 1271-
72 (9th Cir. 1981) (court considered that the Mexican defendant and its witnesses
would have a great distance to travel, and that the defendant would need to translate
testimony and documents if it was forced to defend a suit in Alaska, the forum state.)
6. Compare Hargrave v. Fibreboard Corp., 710 F.2d 1154 (5th Cir.), modified on
other grounds, No. 82-2231, 82-2236, slip op. (5th Cir. Nov. 3, 1983) and Samuels v.
B.M.W. of N. Am. Inc., 554 F. Supp. 1191 (E.D. Tex. 1983) (presence of subsidiary is
not enough to give court jurisdiction over parent corporation) with Graco, Inc. v.
Kremlin, Inc., 558 F. Supp. 188 (N.D. Ill. 1982), Brunswick Corp. v. Suzuki Motor
Co., 575 F. Supp. 1412 (E.D. Wis. 1983), and Weight v. Kawasaki Motors Corp.,
U.S.A., 604 F. Supp. 968 (E.D. Va. 1985) (presence of a subsidiary that is incorpo-
rated or doing business in the forum is enough to give the courts of that state juris-
diction over the parent).
For the purposes of this Note, a "parent corporation" is a corporation that owns
100% of the shares of another corporation, the "subsidiary corporation." This Note
will not address jurisdiction in connection with subsidiaries that are less than wholly-
owned by another corporation.
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Under the traditional rule of corporate separateness,7 United
States federal courts do not have jurisdiction over a parent cor-
poration merely because its subsidiary is incorporated or doing
business in the forum state.8 This is true even though the par-
ent owns 100% of the stock of the subsidiary. 9
A court will have jurisdiction over a parent corporation
when its subsidiary is acting as an agent"0 of the parent corpo-
ration or when the parent corporation controls and dominates
the subsidiary to such an extent that the subsidiary's independ-
ent corporate status is a fiction.'" In the latter situation, which
is frequently referred to as the "alter-ego" theory,' 2 a court
will "pierce the corporate veil" to find that the two corpora-
tions are really one.' 3 Under either the alter-ego theory or the
agency doctrine, the acts of a subsidiary corporation may be
attributed to its parent, thereby giving the parent sufficient
7. See Cannon Mfg. Co. v. Cudahy Packing Co., 267 U.S. 333, 335-36 (1925).
For a discussion of the doctrine of corporate separateness, see infra notes 26-35 and
accompanying text.
8. See Cannon Mfg. Co. v. Cudahy Packing Co., 267 U.S. 333 (1925); RESTATE-
MENT OF CONFLICTS, supra note 1, § 52 comment b.
9. See Cannon Mfg. Co. v. Cudahy Co., 267 U.S. 333 (1925); RESTATEMENT OF
CONFLICTS, supra note 1, § 52 comment b.
10. Agency is a "fiduciary relation which results from the manifestation of con-
sent by one person to another that the other shall act on his behalf and subject to his
control, and consent by the other so to act." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 1
(1958). The one for whom the action is to be taken is the principal and the one who
is to act is the agent. Id. The manifestation of consent does not have to be written or
oral, but can arise from conduct of the principal, which, reasonably interpreted,
causes the agent to believe that the principal desires him to act on the principal's
account. Id. § 26.
A subsidiary may act as an agent for its parent, thereby making the parent a
principal that will be bound by, and benefit from, the acts of its agent. P. BLUMBERG,
THE LAw OF CORPORATE GROUPS 21 (1983). Courts examine many factors to deter-
mine whether a subsidiary is an agent, including whether the subsidiary can bind the
parent contractually, confirm sales or set prices and terms of sales. See Baird v. Day &
Zimmerman, Inc., 390 F. Supp. 883 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), aft'd, 510 F.2d 968 (2d Cir.
1975).
11. 2J. MOORE, J. LUCAS, H. FINK & C. THOMPSON, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE
§ 4.25[6] (2d ed. 1985) [hereinafter cited as 2 J. MOORE]; C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL § 1069 (1969); RESTATEMENT OF CON-
FLICTS, supra note 1, § 52 comment b. For a discussion of when a court may disre-
gard the corporate separateness of a parent and subsidiary, see infra notes 33-37 and
accompanying text.
12. See P. BLUMBERG, supra note 10, at 9; Hargrave, 710 F.2d at 1161.
13. P. BLUMBERG, supra note 10, at 9; see infra notes 34-37 and accompanying
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"contacts" with the forum for due process purposes.1 4
While some courts follow the traditional rule, others have
held that a parent corporation can be doing business within a
state based on the activities of its subsidiary even absent a find-
ing of an agency or alter-ego relationship.1 5 The case law var-
ies from state to state, and two courts may reach opposite con-
clusions on the issue of jurisdiction given the same set of
facts. 16
This Note argues that without the finding of an agency or
alter-ego relationship between a parent and its subsidiary, the
acts of a subsidiary cannot, under the doctrine of corporate
separateness,' 7 be attributed to a parent. Unless the acts of a
subsidiary can be attributed to the parent, the existence of the
parent-subsidiary relationship alone cannot supply the mini-
mum contacts needed to confer jurisdiction on a court over an
alien parent.18 Part I of this Note will discuss the corporation
as a legal entity and the doctrine of corporate separateness.19
After an examination of the pertinent United States Supreme
Court cases on jurisdiction,2 0 an analysis of recent lower court
cases on parent and subsidiary corporations will follow in Part
11.21 Part III will compare the statutory and case law of the
14. See Coca-Cola Co. v. Procter & Gamble Co., 595 F. Supp. 304, 308 (N.D. Ga.
1983); Top Form Mills v. Sociedad Nationale Indus., 428 F. Supp. 1237, 1246 n.10
and accompanying text (S.D.N.Y. 1977); Captain Int'l Indus. v. Westbury, Chicago,
Inc., 416 F. Supp. 721, 722-23 (N.D. Ill. 1975).
15. See, e.g., Brunswick Corp. v. Suzuki Motor Co., 575 F. Supp. 1412 (E.D. Wis.
1983); Graco, Inc. v. Kremlin, Inc., 558 F. Supp. 188 (N.D. Ill. 1982). Some courts
have not addressed the issue of agency or alter-ego in their decisions but find juris-
diction over an alien parent corporation on other grounds, such as the "stream of
commerce" theory or "purposeful availment." See, e.g., Kawasaki, 604 F. Supp. at
970-71. For a discussion of the stream of commerce doctrine see infra notes 73-74
and accompanying text. For a discussion of the purposeful availment doctrine see
infra notes 75-76 and accompanying text.
16. Compare Allen v. Toshiba Corp., 599 F. Supp. 381 (D. N.M. 1984) (court did
not have jurisdiction over alien parent, Toshiba, whose subsidiary transacted busi-
ness in the forum state) with Copiers Typewriters Calculators, Inc. v. Toshiba Corp.,
576 F. Supp. 312 (D. Md. 1983) (court did have jurisdiction over alien parent,
Toshiba, whose subsidiary transacted business in the forum state). For a discussion
of Allen and Copiers, see infra notes 174-86 and accompanying text.
17. For a discussion of the doctrine of corporate separateness, see infra notes
27-37, and accompanying text.
18. See Cannon Mfg. Co. v. Cudahy Packing Co., 267 U.S. 333 (1925).
19. See infra notes 27-37 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 38-105 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 106-205 and accompanying text.
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United States with that of the United Kingdom 2 2 and will dis-
cuss the United States-United Kingdom Convention on the Re-
ciprocal Recognition & Enforcement of Judgments in Civil
Matters (United States-United Kingdom Convention).23 Fi-
nally, Part IV will analyze whether the current movement in the
United States towards expanded jurisdiction is desirable in an
international context. 24 This Note will conclude that United
States courts should not exercise jurisdiction over alien corpo-
rations based on their subsidiaries' contacts with the forum
state unless the court determines that there is an agency or
alter-ego relationship between them.25
I. THE DOCTRINE OF CORPORA TE SEPARATENESS
A corporation is an artificial person or legal entity created
by or under the authority of the laws of a state or nation.26
Under the entity theory27 a corporation is an entity with rights
and liabilities separate from those of its shareholders.28 Under
this view, a subsidiary corporation is also a legal entity, sepa-
rate from its shareholders, notwithstanding that its principal
shareholder is another corporation. 29 The entity theory of cor-
22. See infra notes 206-29 and accompanying text.
23. Initialed at London, October 26, 1976, United States-United Kingdom, 16
I.L.M. 71 (1977) [hereinafter cited as U.S.-U.K. Convention]; see infra notes 230-54
and accompanying text. This Convention has not been ratified. See infra note 230.
For an early draft of the Convention, see Hay & Walker, The Proposed Recognition-of-
Judgments Convention Between the United States and the United Kingdom, 11 TEX. INT'L L.J.
421, 452 (1976).
24. See infra notes 255-98 and accompanying text.
25. See infra notes 299-311 and accompanying text.
26. H. HENN &J. ALEXANDER, LAW OF CORPORATIONS § 78 (3d ed. 1983).
27. In the United States, there are various theories regarding the status of a
corporation. Id. The traditional concept, which is known as the entity theory, is that
a corporation is a fictitious, artificial, legal person or juristic entity created by the
state. Id. The "fiat" or "concession" theory emphasizes the creation of the corpora-
tion by grant from the sovereign. Id. The "realist theory" or "inherence theory"
views the corporation as a group whose group activities require separate legal recog-
nition, and that share many of the attributes of a natural person. Id. The "enterprise
theory" stresses the underlying commercial enterprise. It considers a corporation to
be an aggregate of persons rather than an entity. Id. The "symbol theory" regards
the corporation as the symbol of the aggregate of groupjural relations of the persons
composing the enterprise. Id. The "contract theory" views a corporation as the re-
sult of contracts among the members, between the members and the corporation,
and between the members of the corporation and the state. Id.
28. Id.
29. Engel v. Teleprompter Corp., 703 F.2d 127, 131 (5th Cir. 1983); see Tennes-
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porate separateness provides the traditional basis for the con-
cept of limited liability of a corporation. ° Incorporation for
the purpose of avoiding unlimited liability is generally ac-
cepted under United States law.'
The separate identities of a parent and its subsidiary
should not be disregarded, even if the subsidiary is wholly-
owned, except in unusual circumstances.3 2 A court may disre-
gard corporate separateness, and treat a parent and subsidiary
as one, if the parent exerts so much control over the subsidiary
that the latter does not have an independent corporate exist-
ence. 33 Piercing the corporate veil is one method for a court to
find that it has jurisdiction over a parent corporation.34 A
see Valley Authority v. Exxon Nuclear Co., 753 F.2d 493, 497 (6th Cir. 1985); Matter
of Chrome Plate Inc., 614 F.2d 990, 996 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, Chrome Plate, Inc. v.
United States, 449 U.S. 842 (1980); In re Midwestern Co., 49 B.R. 98, 101 (Bankr.
W.D. Mo. 1985); P. BLUMBERG, supra note 10, at 5.
30. P. BLUMBERG, supra note 10, at 1-2; H. HENN &J. ALEXANDER, supra note 26,
§ 146. In essence, incorporation allows legal entities to limit their liability for actions
or practices of the corporation. See P. BLUMBERG, supra note 10, at 1-2; H. HENN &J.
ALEXANDER, supra note 26, § 146.
31. H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, supra note 26, § 146; see Berger v. Columbia
Broadcasting System, 453 F.2d 991, 994 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 848 (1972)
(one of the principle purposes for legal sanctioning of a separate corporate personal-
ity is to afford shareholders an opportunity to limit their personal liability); Douglas
& Shanks, Insulation from Liability Through Subsidiary Corporations, 39 YALE L.J. 193, 194
(1929).
32. See Parker v. Bell Asbsetos Mines, Ltd., 607 F. Supp. 1397, 1399 (E.D. Pa.
1985) (to disregard corporate form under Pennsylvania law the corporate entity must
be so controlled as to have no "mind" of its own, and there must be a showing that
the corporate entity is being used to defeat public convenience,justify wrong, protect
fraud or defend crime); Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Federal Home Loan Bank Bd., 588
F. Supp. 749, 754-55 (D. D.C. 1984); Andrew Martin Marine Corp. v. Stork-Werk-
spoor Dielsel B.V., 480 F. Supp. 1270, 1275 (E.D. La. 1979), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 989
(1981) (because corporations are legal entities entitled to presumption of separate-
ness, their legal identities should not be lightly disregarded); Boise Cascade Corp. v.
Wheeler, 419 F. Supp. 98, 102 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), aff'd, 556 F.2d 554 (2d Cir. 1977)
(dual personalities of parent and subsidiary are not lightly disregarded) (citing Ber-
ger v. Columbia Broadcasting System, 453 F.2d at 994).
33. 2J. MOORE, supra note 11, § 4.25[6]; RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICTS, supra note
1, § 52 comment b.
34. 2 J. MOORE, supra note 11, § 4.25[6]. To determine whether to pierce the
corporate veil, courts examine various criteria, including:
1) whether the two corporations have intermingled their business transactions,
tax returns, financial statements, bank accounts, and corporate records. See Scott v.
Mego Int'l, Inc., 519 F. Supp. 1118, 1126 (D. Minn. 1981);
2) whether the two corporations have failed to observe the formalities of cor-
porate separateness by holding joint meetings or sharing the same officers and direc-
tors. See id.; Bulova Watch Co. v. K. Hattori & Co., 508 F. Supp. 1322, 1331-32, 1341
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court may use this technique either for jurisdictional purposes
or to determine ultimate liability. 5
Some courts are more likely to disregard the corporate
separateness of the parent and subsidiary corporations when
applying the criteria for piercing the corporate veil.3 6 Other
(E.D.N.Y. 1981) (the sharing of a key officer by both the parent and the subsidiary
was one factor the court considered in finding jurisdiction over an alien parent cor-
poration). The sharing of some of the same officers and directors does not, however,
necessarily lead to a piercing of the corporate veil. See Hargrave, 710 F.2d at 1162
(citing Miles v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 703 F.2d 193, 195 (5th Cir. 1983)); Harris
v. Deere & Co., 223 F.2d 161, 162 (4th Cir. 1955); Douglas & Shanks, supra note 31,
at 196;
3) whether the subsidiary corporation is inadequately financed as a separate
entity, because of either initial inadequate financing or because the parent has
drained the subsidiary's earnings to keep the subsidiary financially dependent. See
Hargrave, 710 F.2d at 1162; Allen v. Toshiba Corp., 599 F. Supp. 381, 389 (D. N.M.
1984);
4) whether the respective enterprises hold themselves out to the public as one
entity. See Hargrave, 710 F.2d at 1162; Bulova Watch, 508 F. Supp. at 1340 (parent and
subsidiary held themselves out as one corporation in advertisements);
5) whether the two corporations keep their daily business separate. Douglas &
Shanks, supra note 31, at 197; see Hargrave, 710 F.2d at 1160; see also H. HENN &J.
ALEXANDER, supra note 26, § 148 (discussing intermingling of business transactions,
failure to observe corporate formalities, inadequate financing and holding corpora-
tions out to the public as one entity); 2J. MOORE, supra note 11, § 4.25[6] (discussing
intermingling of business transactions, failure to observe corporate formalities, hold-
ing corporations out to the public as one entity, keeping daily business separate and
whether the subsidiary pays cash for products sold or services rendered to it by the
parent).
In Scott v. Mego Int'l Inc., 519 F. Supp. 1118 (D. Minn. 1981), the court found
that the defendant and its subsidiary shared common directors and officers; issued
consolidated summaries of operation, financial statements, income statements and
statements of shareholders' equity; filed consolidated federal income tax returns; that
the parent held out to the public that it had substantial control over the subsidiary,
and that there was in fact evidence of such control. Id. at 1126. After an analysis of
these factors, the court held that it had jurisdiction over the non-resident defendant.
Id.
Courts have also used the doctrine of agency to exercise jurisdiction over a par-
ent corporation based on the activities of its subsidiary. See supra note 10 and accom-
panying text.
35. Compare Coca-Cola Co. v. Procter & Gamble Co., 595 F. Supp. 304, 307-08
(N.D. Ga. 1983) (court found that subsidiary was a mere division of parent and there-
fore could exercise jurisdiction over parent) and Scott, 519 F. Supp. at 1126 (nature of
parent-subsidiary relationship permitted court to exercise jurisdiction over parent)
with Tennessee Valley Authority v. Exxon Nuclear Co., 753 F.2d 493, 497 (6th Cir.
1985) (piercing thecorporate veil is generally done to impose liability on a parent
corporation) and United States v. Jon-T Chemicals, Inc., 768 F.2d 686, 695 (5th Cir.
1985) (court found subsidiary was alter-ego of parent and therefore parent was liable
for the subsidiary's fraudulent actions), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1194 (1986).
36. See, e.g., Willis v. American Permac, Inc., 541 F. Supp. 118, 121-22 (D. Mass.
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courts will pierce the corporate veil only when there is "virtu-
ally total disregard" by the parent of the corporate form of the
subsidiary.3 7 The opinion of a court, as to the degree of con-
1982). The court, in Willis, disregarded the corporate separateness of the parent and
subsidiary, finding the parent was the sole shareholder of the subsidiary, the corpora-
tions had significant intermingling of officers and directors, and that the parent had,
on two occasions, appointed officers of the subsidiary without the approval of the
subsidiary's board of directors. Id. at 119, 122. Although the court found that the
parent undertook responsibility for the liabilities of the subsidiary by agreement, it
did not set forth the facts that lead to this conclusion. Id. The court held that it had
jurisdiction over the parent corporation based on the activities of its subsidiary. Id. at
121-22.
Another case in which the court disregarded the corporate separateness of the
parent and its subsidiary to exercise jurisdiction over the former was Katz Agency,
Inc. v. Evening News Ass'n, 514 F. Supp. 423 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), aff'd, 705 F.2d 20 (2d
Cir. 1983). In Katz, the court found that the subsidiary was a mere department of the
parent, and therefore, the parent was doing business in New York through its subsid-
iary. Id. at 429. In support of its exercise of jurisdiction, the court noted that the
parent corporation's vice president had referred to an agency as the employee of the
parent, in a correspondence to that agency, whereas the agency was the sales repre-
sentative of the subsidiary. Id. at 428-29. In addition, the court determined that the
agency appeared to be unaware of the existence of the subsidiary. See id. These facts
tend to imply that the parent and subsidiary were holding themselves out to the pub-
lic as one corporation, which is one factor that courts use to determine whether to
pierce the corporate veil. See supra note 35. The court did not examine other factors
relevant to piercing the corporate veil, but determined that these facts alone were
sufficient to support the court's exercise ofjurisdiction over the parent. Katz, 514 F.
Supp. at 429.
37. See Hargrave, 710 F.2d at 1163 (quoting Edwards Co. v. Monogram Indus.,
Inc., 700 F.2d 994, 1004 (5th Cir. 1983)). In Hargrave, the court stated that the mere
domination of a subsidiary by a parent is not a sufficient basis for the court to pierce
the corporate veil. Id. "Of course the parent may dominate the subsidiary. A subsid-
iary by its nature is ultimately subservient in any case .... The parent can dictate the
direction, the form and the style of the subsidiary. It can hire and fire, create and
dissolve. And the subsidiary will still insulate the parent from liabilities incurred by
the subsidiary." Id. (quoting Edwards Co., 700 F.2d at 1002).
In Beary v. Norton-Simon, Inc., 479 F. Supp. 812 (W.D. Pa. 1979), the parent
owned 100% of the stock of the subsidiary, three of the six members of the board of
directors of the subsidiary held positions as officers of the parent, 50% of the earn-
ings of the subsidiary were distributed to the parent, the parent had made loans to
the subsidiary and engaged in cash transactions with the subsidiary on a daily basis.
Id. at 814. Nevertheless, the court held that it did not have jurisdiction over the
parent under the alter-ego doctrine because the plaintiff had not alleged the perpe-
tration of fraud, illegality or injustice by means of the parent-subsidiary relationship
and the parent and the subsidiary operated as separate corporate entities. Id. at 814-
15. The court also held that it did not have jurisdiction over the parent under the
agency doctrine even though the subsidiary was subject to some degree of control by
the parent, which directed some marketing, auditing and advertising functions of its
subsidiaries. Id. at 815. The court stressed that there was no evidence of an intercor-
porate relationship of the parent and subsidiary with regard to the specific facts
which gave rise to the plaintiff's claim. Id. Therefore, the court held that the evi-
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trol a parent corporation can legitimately exercise over a sub-
sidiary, may affect its decision whether to pierce the corporate
veil, and, based on the activities of the subsidiary, to take juris-
diction over a parent corporation.
II. THE BOUNDARIES OF DUE PROCESS
A. United States Supreme Court Cases
The first major United States Supreme Court case to ad-
dress jurisdiction over a parent corporation, based on the ac-
tivities of its subsidiary in the forum state, was Cannon Manufac-
turing Co. v. Cudahy Packing Co. 38 The Court, in Cannon, indi-
cated that it would accept a large degree of control by a parent
over a subsidiary, without subjecting the parent to the jurisdic-
tion of a foreign court.39
Cannon involved a North Carolina corporation that sued a
Maine corporation for breach of contract in a North Carolina
court.40 To determine whether the North Carolina court had
jurisdiction over the Maine corporation, Cudahy Packing Com-
pany, the United States Supreme Court examined whether the
defendant had been doing business in the state.4' To deter-
mine whether the defendant had been doing business in the
state, the Court examined the relationship between the de-
fendant and its subsidiary.42
Cudahy Packing Company itself did no business in North
Carolina, but its subsidiary, Cudahy Packing Company of Ala-
bama, had an office in North Carolina and was employed to
market the parent's products there.43 The Court expressly
found that the subsidiary was not acting as an agent for the
defendant.44 In addition, the Court found that the parent and
the subsidiary were two separate entities, even though the par-
dence of the parent's control of the subsidiary was insufficient to establish an agency
relationship between the parent and the subsidiary. Id.
38. 267 U.S. 333 (1925).
39. See id. at 335-37.
40. Id. at 334.
41. Id. at 335.
42. Id.
43. Id. The subsidiary bought goods from the defendant and then sold them to
dealers. Id. The parent corporation packed the goods in Iowa and shipped them
directly to dealers. Id. The subsidiary then collected the purchase price. Id.
44. Id.
1986] 549
550 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LA WJOURNAL [Vol. 9:540
ent owned the entire capital stock of the subsidiary and exerted
commercial and financial control over the subsidiary in the
same manner as it controlled the branches of its business that
were not separately incorporated.4 5 The Court stressed that
although "[t]he corporate separation ... [was] perhaps merely
formal, [it] was real. It was not pure fiction."' 46 Therefore, for
the purposes of determining jurisdiction, the Court held that it
could not find that the business of the subsidiary in North Car-
olina became the business of the defendant parent corpora-
tion.4 7
Twenty years after Cannon, the United States Supreme
Court set forth the modern standard for in personam jurisdic-
tion in International Shoe Co. v. Washington.41 In International
Shoe, the Court stated that to subject a defendant to a judg-
ment in personam when he is not present within the forum, the
only requirement under the due process clause is that he have
"certain minimum contacts with [the forum,] such that the
maintenance of the suit does not offend 'traditional notions of
fair play and substantial justice.' " 49 The relationship between
the defendant and the forum also has to be "reasonable ... to
require the corporation to defend the particular suit which is
brought there."5
Soon after International Shoe, the Supreme Court read-
dressed the subject of jurisdiction over a parent corporation
based on the activities of its subsidiary, but in the context of
United States antitrust law. In United States v. Scophony Corp. ,5
the Court held that personal jurisdiction over a United King-
dom corporation was established in New York through the
presence of its subsidiary, which was doing business in the
state.5 2 Jurisdiction was based on the parent's continuing su-
pervision over the subsidiary and its intervention in the subsid-
45. Id. The court noted that the two corporations kept separate books and re-
corded all transactions between them as though they were two independent corpora-
tions. Id.
46. Id. at 337 (Brandeis, J.).
47. Id. at 338.
48. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
49. Id. at 316 (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463, reh'g denied, 312
U.S. 712 (1940)).
50. Id. at 317.
51. 333 U.S. 795 (1948).
52. Id. at 818.
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iary's affairs.53
The issue in Scophony, unlike Cannon, was whether the de-
fendant had "transacted business" in New York, or could be
"found" in the state5 4 within the meaning of section 12 of the
Clayton Act. 55 This difference is an important one because the
test for jurisdiction under the Clayton Act has been viewed to
be broader than the test which is used in other contexts.
56
53. Id. at 814. American Scophony was created by the contractual agreements
Scophony executed with the other defendant corporations. Id. at 798. The Court
found that these contracts established a pattern for a regular and continuing pro-
gram of patent exploitation that required Scophony's constant supervision and inter-
vention in the affairs of its subsidiary, American Scophony. Id. at 814. The president
of American Scophony was also a director of Scophony. Id. at 815. The Court found
that the president received and carried out instructions from Scophony regarding
American Scophony's affairs. Id. The Court stated that it could almost be said that,
while in New York, "he was the [parent] company." Id. at 816.
54. Id. at 796.
55. Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 22 (1982). Section 12 of the Clayton Act states that
"[a]ny suit, action, or proceeding under the antitrust laws against a corporation may
be brought not only in the judicial district whereof it is an inhabitant, but also in any
district wherein it may be found or transacts business; and all process in such cases
may be served in the district of which it is an inhabitant, or wherever it may be
found." Id. In Scophony, the United States Government charged that Scophony Lim-
ited, its subsidiary, Scophony Corporation of America, three other United States cor-
porations and three individuals had monopolized, attempted to monopolize, and
conspired to restrain and monopolize interstate and foreign commerce in patents
and inventions useful in television and allied industries. United States v. Scophony
Corp., 333 U.S. at 796-97.
56. See Flank Oil Co. v. Continental Oil Co., 277 F. Supp. 357, 364-65 (D. Colo.
1967); Akzona Inc. v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 607 F. Supp. 227, 239 (D. Del.
1984); Call Carl, Inc. v. BP Oil Corp., 391 F. Supp. 367, 372-73 (D. Md. 1975); Wal-
dron v. British Petroleum Co., 149 F. Supp. 830, 834-35 (S.D.N.Y. 1957). The court,
in Flank Oil, stated that the underlying policy reasons in antitrust actions require a
more "penetrating" analysis of business activity within a state than might be neces-
sary in other situations. Flank Oil, 277 F. Supp. at 364.
The court in Akzona stated that the Supreme Court in Scophony distinguished its
decision from Cannon Mfg. Co. v. Cudahy Packing Co., 267 U.S. 333 (1925), on the
grounds that Scophony arose under United States antitrust laws, and that a more leni-
ent standard for jurisdiction was necessary to effectuate the policies of antitrust stat-
utes. Akzona, 607 F. Supp. at 239 (citing Scophony, 333 U.S. at 817). While the Court
in Scophony did not actually make this distinction, the implication is apparent. The
Court, in Scophony, stated that it did not have a factual situation similar to those
presented in the "manufacturing and selling cases," Scophony, 333 U.S. at 816,
whereas earlier in its decision, the Court had referred to Cannon as an example of a
"manufacturing and selling compan[y]." Id. at 813 n.23 and accompanying text.
"[T]hose decisions [involving manufacturing and selling activities] may be left un-
touched for the facts and situations in which they have arisen and to which they have
been applied." Id. at 817. The Court then discussed why an expansion ofjurisdic-
tion in the area of antitrust was important to the implementation of the policies be-
hind the antitrust laws. Id. Therefore, it would appear that the Supreme Court was
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Nevertheless, some commentators view Scophony as overruling
Cannon by implication.57 However, there is no language in the
implying that Scophony was distinguishable from Cannon because Scophony arose in the
context of an antitrust litigation.
57. See P. BLUMBERG, supra note 10, at 47; Rosic, In Personam Jurisdiction Over For-
eign Parent Corporations, 6 AsILS INT'L LJ. 19, 28 (1982). Professor Blumberg failed to
cite any case that espoused the position that Scophony overrules Cannon in areas other
than antitrust. Furthermore, certain courts are divided over whether Scophony over-
ruled Cannon in antitrust litigation. Some courts, in light of Scophony, have refused to
apply Cannon in an antitrust context. See, e.g., Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec-
tronics Ind., 402 F. Supp. 262, 319 (E.D. Pa. 1975); Call Carl, 391 F. Supp. at 372-73;
Flank Oil, 277 F. Supp. at 364-65. Other courts have adopted the Cannon rationale in
antitrust cases. See, e.g., San Antonio Tel. Co. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 499 F.2d
349, 352 (5th Cir. 1974); O.S.C. Corp. v. Toshiba Am., Inc., 491 F.2d 1064, 1067-68
(9th Cir. 1974) (per curiam); Indian Coffee Corp. v. Procter & Gamble Co., 482 F.
Supp. 1098, 1104 (W.D. Pa. 1980), modified on other grounds, 752 F.2d 891 (3rd Cir.
1985); Wireline, Inc. v. Byron Jackson Tools, Inc., 239 F. Supp. 955, 960-61 (D.
Mont. 1964), aft'd, 344 F.2d 331 (9th Cir. 1965); Goldlawr, Inc. v. Shubert, 169 F.
Supp. 677, 684 (E.D. Pa. 1958), aff'd, 276 F.2d 614 (3d Cir. 1960); Fisher Baking Co.
v. Continental Baking Corp., 238 F. Supp. 322, 327-28 (D. Utah 1956).
Kramer Motors, Inc. v. British Leyland Ltd., 628 F.2d 1175 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
449 U.S. 1062 (1980), was an action in which plaintiff automobile dealer alleged a
conspiracy between three United Kingdom corporations to drive the plaintiff out of
business. Id. at 1176. The court, in Kramer Motors, did not discuss either Cannon or
Scophony. However, the Kramer Motors court did follow Cannon 's traditional approach
to jurisdiction over alien parent corporations. Id. at 1177-78. In Kramer Motors, the
court examined the presence of three United Kingdom corporations that had a sub-
sidiary in the United States. One of the United Kingdom corporations was the parent
of the United States corporation. The other United Kingdom defendants were affili-
ated holding companies. Id. at 1176 n.2 and accompanying text. The court found
that the parent and subsidiary had shared certain directors and officers. Id. at 1177.
In addition, the court found that executives of the parent corporation worked closely
with executives of the subsidiary on the pricing of vehicles for the United States mar-
ket. Id. The court, however, stated that these facts were insufficient to make the
subsidiary the alter-ego or agent of the parents. Id. Although the parent corporation
did approve the subsidiary's marketing scheme that eventually caused the plaintiff to
lose its supply of automobiles, the court did not view this action as "the kind of
deliberate forum protection-invoking act which the law requires" to assert personal
jurisdiction over an alien corporation. Id. at 1178. Significantly, one of the defend-
ants in Kramer Motors was a company that was 95% owned by the government of the
United Kingdom. Id. at 1176 n.2. The possibility that the acts of that company may
have constituted foreign acts of state concerned the court and may have influenced
its decision not to exercise jurisdiction over the defendants. See id. at 1178.
For a comparison ofjurisdiction over alien corporations under the United States
Internal Revenue Code (IRC), 26 U.S.C. §§ 1 et. seq., with jurisdiction over such
corporations under the United States antitrust laws, see United States v. Toyota Mo-
tor Corp., 561 F. Supp. 354 (C.D. Cal. 1983). The action in Toyota was to enforce two
summonses of the Internal Revenue Service, one of which was issued to a Japanese
corporation, and the other to its wholly-owned subsidiary, which was incorporated in
the forum state of California. Id. at 355. The United States Government claimed
jurisdiction under section 7604(a) of the IRC, which provides that the Internal Reve-
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Scophony opinion that indicates that Cannon is no longer good
law.58
Some courts and commentators have argued that Cannon
is no longer good law after the United States Supreme Court's
decision in International Shoe.59 Under this view, the derivation
nue Service may bring a petition to enforce a summons in the "district court for the
district in which [the person summoned] resides or is found." I.R.C. § 7604(a)
(1985). In interpreting this section of the IRC, the court determined that the Japa-
nese corporation did not reside in the state but could be "found" there through the
presence of its subsidiary, and therefore the court had jurisdiction. Toyota, 561 F.
Supp. at 357-58. The court did look at certain factors pertinent to the alter-ego the-
ory but stated that it could find jurisdiction over a parent corporation under the IRC
regardless of whether its subsidiary acted as the parent's agent or was its alter-ego.
Id. at 358-59. This is because section 482 of the IRC may be invoked whenever two
business organizations are owned or controlled directly or indirectly by the same
interests. Id. at 359. The court could find no case law interpreting "found" in the
context of the IRC, but it argued that because the term had been given a broad inter-
pretation under the copyright venue provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1400(a), it should also
be given a broad interpretation under the IRC. Id. at 357. The court rejected the
parent corporation's argument that the court should adopt the more restrictive inter-
pretation of the word "found" that certain courts have given it in cases arising under
section 12 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 22, and mentioned Kramer Motors, and
O.S.C. Corp. v. Toshiba Am., Inc., 491 F.2d 1064 (9th Cir. 1974) (per curiam), by
way of example. Id. at 358. The court distinguished the antitrust cases by finding
that the antitrust laws were intended to provide remedy for business-related injuries,
which is not the intent of the IRC. Id. at 358. Under the antitrust laws, if it is the
domestic subsidiary of an alien corporation that has engaged in the complained of
activities, the court argued that there may be no reason to subject the parent to suit
unless it had contributed directly to the conduct by employing the subsidiary as an
"alter-ego" or "agent." Id. However, in Kramer Motors, the plaintiff alleged a con-
spiracy between the parent and the subsidiary to put the plaintiff out of business.
Kramer Motors, 628 F.2d at 1176. Therefore, in that instance, the parent was allegedly
directly involved in the complained of activity, yet the court still did not take jurisdic-
tion. The Toyota court also ignored that in Scophony, the Supreme Court stressed that
the intent of the antitrust laws is to encourage an expansion ofjurisdiction over non-
domiciliaries, rather than discourage it, as the Toyota court's analysis of the antitrust
cases seemed to suggest. See Scophony, 333 U.S. at 817. Therefore, the distinction
made by the Toyota court between the tax and the antitrust cases may be of limited
value.
58. The Court in Scophony only mentioned the Cannon decision once, in a foot-
note, as an example of a case involving jurisdiction over manufacturing and selling
companies. Scophony, 333 U.S. at 813 n.23. The cite to Cannon is an innocuous one,
and it would be difficult to draw an inference from it at all, favorable or unfavorable,
except to note that the court was certainly aware of the decision.
59. See P. BLUMBERG, supra note 10, at 46; Brunswick, 575 F. Supp. at 1419 (dis-
cussed infra notes 165-73 and accompanying text); Coca-Cola Co. v. Procter & Gam-
ble Co., 595 F. Supp. 304, 307-08 (N.D. Ga. 1983); Roorda v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G.,
481 F. Supp. 868, 879 (D. S.C. 1979); Energy Reserves Group, Inc. v. Superior Oil
Co., 460 F. Supp. 483, 495-508 (D. Kan. 1978) (extensive discussion of the Cannon
doctrine in relation to International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945),
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of economic benefits from the operation of a subsidiary in a
distant forum constitutes sufficient contacts with that forum to
meet the minimum contacts test of International Shoe.60 How-
ever, if the mere presence of a subsidiary doing business in the
state were enough to confer jurisdiction over an alien parent, it
would have been unnecessary for the United States Supreme
Court to inquire, as it did, into the details of the relationship
between the parent and the subsidiary in Scophony.
6 1
Cannon was the last United States Supreme Court case to
address the issue of jurisdiction over a parent corporation
based on the activities of its subsidiary within the forum.6 2 The
next pertinent Supreme Court case to generally address juris-
diction over foreign corporations was World Wide Volkswagen
Corp. v. Woodson.6" In Volkswagen, the Court reversed 64 the
judgment of the Supreme Court of Oklahoma,6 5 predicated on
and Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977), as well as an examination of recent case
law relying on Cannon).
60. P. BLUMBERG, supra note 10, at 46; see also Roorda, 481 F. Supp. at 881 (de-
fendant corporation should not complain about the burdens of defending in a distant
forum when it derives benefits from that forum through its relationship with its sub-
sidiary).
61. Scophony, 333 U.S. at 797-802, 810-16. A problem with Professor
Blumberg's theory is his mistaken impression that Scophony, which was decided in
1948, came before International Shoe, when in fact International Shoe was decided three
years earlier, in 1945. See P. BLUMBERG, supra note 10, at 47.
62. 267 U.S. 333 (1925). Scophony was decided after Cannon, but Scophony ap-
pears to be limited to antitrust cases. See supra notes 55-58 and accompanying text.
63. 444 U.S. 286 (1980). In Volkswagen, the Court addressed the issue of
whether an Oklahoma court could constitutionally exercise in personam jurisdiction,
in a products liability action, over a nonresident automobile retailer and its wholesale
distributor when the defendants' only connection with the state was that an automo-
bile sold in New York to residents of that state became involved in an accident in
Oklahoma. World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson, 444 U.S. at 287.
The defendants that challenged the Oklahoma court's jurisdiction were two New
York corporations, Seaway Volkswagen, Inc. (Seaway), and World-Wide Volkswagen
Corporation (World-Wide). Id. at 288-89. Seaway was a retail dealer and World-
Wide was the regional distributor for retail dealers in New York, New Jersey and
Connecticut. The other defendants were Audi NSU Auto Union Aktiengesellschaft
(Audi), the manufacturer of the allegedly defective automobile, and Volkswagen of
America, Inc. (Volkswagen), the importer of the automobile to the United States. Id.
at 288. Audi, an alien corporation, did not challenge the court's jurisdiction over it.
See id. at 288. Volkswagen had entered a special appearance in the district court but
did not seek review in the Supreme Court of Oklahoma, and was not a petitioner in
the case before the United States Supreme Court. Id. at 288 n.3.
64. Id. at 299.
65. 585 P.2d 351 (Okla. 1978). Here, the Oklahoma court denied defendant's
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a provision of the Oklahoma long arm statute,66 that provides
for jurisdiction when a person causes a tortious injury in that
state. 6 7 The decision by the Court made it clear that the mini-
mum contacts test of International Shoe is applicable to asser-
tions of jurisdiction based on state long arm statutes.68
The Court stressed that the burden on the defendant of
litigating in a distant and inconvenient forum was the primary
concern in evaluating the reasonableness of the court's exer-
cise of jurisdiction.69  Other factors, such as the forum state's
interest in adjudicating the dispute, 70 and the plaintiff's inter-
est in obtaining convenient and effective relief,71 would also be
considered in appropriate cases.72
In Volkswagen, the Court stated that a court does not ex-
ceed its power under the due process clause if it asserts per-
writ of prohibition to restrain the district court judge from exercising in personam
jurisdiction over them. Id. at 355.
66. Long arm statutes are jurisdictional statutes that predicate jurisdiction over
non-residents upon a variety of contacts with the forum, including the transaction of
business in the state, the commission of any one of a series of enumerated acts within
the state, such as the commission of a tort, ownership of property, or entry into a
contract, or, in some cases, the commission of a particular act outside the forum that
has consequences within. SeeJ. FRIEDENTHAL, M. KANE, A. MILLER, CIVIL PROCEDURE
139-40 (1985).
67. OKLA. STAT. ANN., tit. 12, § 1701.03(a)(4), repealed and superseded by OKLA.
STAT. ANN., tit. 12, § 2004 (West 1980 and Supp. 1985). Prior to repeal, this subsec-
tion of the statute provided that a court may exercise jurisdiction over a person who,
directly or through an agent, causes tortious injury in the state "if he regularly does
or solicits business or engages in any other persistent course of conduct or derives
substantial revenue from goods used or consumed or services rendered in th[e]
state."
68. See Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 291.
69. Id. at 292.
70. Id. at 292 (citing McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223
(1957)). The Court, in McGee, held that the defendant's solicitation of business from
the plaintiff's decedent, the mailing of an insurance contract to him, and the accept-
ance of premiums the decedent sent to the defendant while the decedent was living
in the forum state were sufficient contacts with the forum for the court to exercise
personal jurisdiction over the defendant. McGee, 355 U.S. at 223.
71. Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292 (citing Kulko v. Superior Court of California, 436
U.S. 84, 92, reh'g denied, 438 U.S. 908 (1978)). In Kulko, the Court held that the Cali-
fornia court's exercise of in personam jurisdiction over a nonresident, non-domicili-
ary parent of minor children domiciled in that state, in an action for child support,
violated the due process clause. Kulko, 436 U.S. at 86, 101.
72. Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292. Other factors the Court mentioned in Volk-
swagen were the interstate judicial system's interest in obtaining the most effective
resolution of controversies and the several states' shared interest in furthering funda-
mental social policies. Id.; see Kulko, 436 U.S. at 93, 98.
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sonal jurisdiction over a corporation that delivers its products
into the "stream of commerce" and expects that they will be
purchased by consumers in that state.73 A number of courts
have relied on the stream of commerce test to assert jurisdic-
tion over an alien corporation.74
In addition, the Court in Volkswagen reaffirmed a "pur-
poseful availment" test, whereby a corporation that " 'pur-
posefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities
within the forum State' . . . has clear notice that it [will be]
subject to suit there."' 75  This "test" has also been used by
many courts to justify their assertion of jurisdiction over alien
corporations.76
In Shaffer v. Heitner,17 the United States Supreme Court ad-
dressed the issue of whether a court could exercise jurisdiction
over a defendant by sequestering his property located in the
forum state.78 The Court held that, by itself, the presence of
property that is unrelated to the plaintiff's cause of action was
insufficient to support the court's assertion of jurisdiction.79
73. Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297-98. The "stream of commerce" theory has been
defined as "a means of sustaining jurisdiction in products liability cases in which the
product ha[s] traveled through an extensive chain of distribution before reaching the
ultimate consumer." Dejames v. Magnificence Carriers, Inc., 654 F.2d 280, 285 (3rd
Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1085 (1981).
74. See, e.g., Kawasaki, 604 F. Supp. at 970 (personal injury tort); Copiers, 576 F.
Supp. at 320 (D. Md. 1983) (business tort); cf. Graco, 558 F. Supp. at 193 (business
tort) (court did not use the term "stream of commerce" but stated that the products
of the alien parent were sold in the state on a regular basis and used this fact to
support its assertion of jurisdiction). The stream of commerce test has been most
frequently relied on in tort actions.
75. Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297 (quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253,
reh'g denied, 358 U.S. 858 (1958)). In Hanson, a Florida court attempted to exercise
personal jurisdiction over a Delaware trustee. While the testatrix of the trust died a
resident of Florida, she created a trust while domiciled in Pennsylvania. Hanson, 357
U.S. at 238-39. Although there was correspondence between the Delaware trustee
and the testatrix while she was in Florida, and the trust was connected with the forum
state, the court held that Florida did not acquire jurisdiction over the defendant
trustee. Id. at 254. The Court asserted that in order to satisfy the minimum contacts
test, there must be "some act by which the defendant purposely avails itself of the
privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits
and protection of its laws." Id. at 253.
76. See, e.g., Graco, 558 F. Supp. at 193; Copiers, 576 F. Supp. at 320; Toyota, 561
F. Supp. at 359.
77. 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
78. Id. at 189.
79. Id. at 209. It could be argued that a subsidiary is the "property" of the par-
ent corporation and therefore under Shaffer the existence of a subsidiary in the forum
1986] CORPORATE SEPARATENESS
In Shafer, the Court stated that the foundation of in per-
sonam jurisdiction is the "relationship among the defendant,
the forum and the litigation."8 The importance of this rela-
tionship was reaffirmed in Helicopteros Nacionales de Columbia,
S.A. v. Hall8 in reference to "specific jurisdiction. ' 82  In
Helicopteros the Court indicated, however, that when a court
wished to exercise "general jurisdiction"8 3 over a defendant,
the contacts between the defendant and the forum had to be
"continuous and systematic."'8 4
In 1985, the United States Supreme Court decided two
state would be insufficient, in and of itself, to confer jurisdiction on a court. See id.
This argument is weak, however, because courts do not base jurisdiction on the mere
existence of a subsidiary within the forum state, but rather that the subsidiary is do-
ing business there. See, e.g., Brunswick, 575 F. Supp. at 1421-22; Kawasaki, 604 F.
Supp. at 970-71; Graco, 558 F. Supp. at 192.
80. Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 204.
81. 466 U.S. 408, 414 (1984). In Helicopteros Nacionales de Columbia, S.A. v.
Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (1984), the representative of four United States citizens, who died
when a helicopter owned by the defendant, a Columbia corporation, crashed in Peru,
brought wrongful death actions against the defendant in a Texas court. Helicopteros,
466 U.S. at 410. The issue before the Supreme Court was whether the contacts be-
tween the Columbia corporation and Texas were sufficient to permit a Texas state
court to exercise jurisdiction over the defendant in a cause of action that did not arise
out of, and was not related to, the corporation's activities in that state. Id. at 409.
The defendant's contacts with Texas were limited, consisting of one trip by the de-
fendant's chief executive officer to the state, the defendant's acceptance of checks
drawn on a Texas bank, and the defendant's purchase of helicopters and equipment
from a Texas manufacturer and related training trips. Id. at 410-11. The Court held
that these contacts were insufficient to satisfy the requirements of the due process
clause when the state was attempting to assert "general jurisdiction" over the de-
fendant. Id. at 415-16. Therefore, the Texas court could not constitutionally exer-
cise in personam jurisdiction over the defendant. Id. at 418-19. For a discussion of
general jurisdiction, see infra notes 83-84 and accompanying text.
82. When a controversy arises out of, or is related to a defendant's contacts with
the state, the court's exercise ofjurisdiction over the defendant is "specific jurisdic-
tion." Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, - U.S. -_, 105 S. Ct. 2174, 2182 n.15 and
accompanying text (1985).
83. When a court exercises personal jurisdiction over a defendant in a suit not
arising out of nor related to the defendant's contacts with the forum, the court's
exercise ofjurisdiction over the defendant is "general jurisdiction." Helicopteros, 466
U.S. at 414 n.9.
84. Id. at 414-15 (referring to Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S.
437, 438, reh'g denied, 343 U.S. 917 (1952)). In Perkins, the Court found that the alien
corporate defendant had maintained a continuous and systematic, although limited,
part of its general business in Ohio through its president. Perkins, 342 U.S. at 438.
Under these circumstances, the Court held that jurisdiction over the corporation was
"reasonable and just." Id. at 445.
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cases in relation to jurisdiction over foreign persons. 85 In Bur-
ger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz,86 the Supreme Court addressed the
issue of whether, in a franchise dispute, the exercise of long
arm jurisdiction by a Florida court over a Michigan franchisee
offended due process.87 The Court upheld the constitutional-
ity of this exercise of jurisdiction for two reasons. First, the
defendant had established a substantial, continuing relation-
ship with the plaintiff franchisor's Florida headquarters.88 Sec-
ond, the franchise agreement provided that the franchise was
established in Florida, and was governed by the law of that
state.8 9
In Burger King, the Supreme Court reiterated the minimum
contacts test of International Shoe as the constitutional "touch-
stone" of personal jurisdiction. 90 Furthermore, the Court held
that when a defendant deliberately engages in significant activ-
ities within the state,9' he manifestly avails himself of the privi-
lege of conducting business there. 92 Because a defendant's ac-
tivities are shielded by the "benefits and protections" of the
forum's law, 93 it is presumably not unreasonable to subject him
to the burdens of litigating in that forum.94
It could be argued, following the reasoning in Burger King,
that when an alien corporation owns a subsidiary that is incor-
porated or doing business in a state, an alien parent is deliber-
85. See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, - - U.S. -, 105 S. Ct. 2174 (1985);
Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, - U.S. -_, 105 S. Ct. 2965 (1985). In the context of
these two cases, a "foreign" person is a citizen of one of the states of the United
States other than the forum state. See supra note 1.
86. - U.S. -, 105 S. Ct. 2174 (1985).
87. Id. at 2177-78.
88. Id. at 2186-87, 2190.
89. Id. at 2178, 2187. There were very few contacts between the defendant and
the forum in this case other than a brief training course the defendant attended
there. Id. at 2186.
90. Id. at 2183.
91. Id. at 2184 (citing Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770 (1984)).
Keeton involved a libel suit brought in New Hampshire against the defendant maga-
zine publisher, an Ohio corporation. Keeton, 465 U.S. at 772. The defendant's only
contact with New Hampshire was the monthly sales of 10-15,000 copies of its maga-
zine. Id. at 772. The court held that the defendant's regular circulation of magazines
in the forum state was sufficient to support the exercise ofjurisdiction by its courts in
a libel action based on the contents of the magazine. Id. at 773-74, 781.
92. Burger King, - U.S. at -., 105 S. Ct. at 2184.
93. Id. (referring to its decision in Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. at 253). For a
discussion of Hanson, see supra note 75.
94. Burger King, - U.S. at -, 105 S. Ct. at 2184.
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ately engaging in significant activities there.95 Therefore, a
court of that state should have jurisdiction over the alien par-
ent. This argument is flawed because it neglects that a subsidi-
ary corporation is a separate entity from its parent.96  The
Supreme Court, in Burger King, stressed that it is the acts of the
defendant himself that are crucial in determining whether the
defendant has a substantial connection with the forum state.97
The acts of a subsidiary cannot, under traditional United States
corporate law, be attributed to a parent corporation unless it
can be shown that the two corporations should be treated as
one under the alter-ego or agency doctrines. 98
The second 1985 United States Supreme Court case ad-
dressing the issue ofjurisdiction over foreign persons was Phil-
lips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts.99 In Phillips, a class action to recover
interest on certain royalty payments,' 0 0 the Supreme Court
considered whether the due process clause prevented a Kansas
court from adjudicating the claims of members of a plaintiff
class that did not possess minimum contacts with the state.' 0 '
The Court held that absent class action plaintiffs are entitled to
protection from the exercise of jurisdiction by courts in states
with which they do not have sufficient contacts.1 0 2 However, as
long as a state affords a class action plaintiff minimal due pro-
cess protection, it is not necessary for each plaintiff to possess
the minimum contacts with the state that would be necessary to
support jurisdiction over a defendant.'0 3 Accordingly, the
Court stressed that litigation places a heavier burden on out-
of-state defendants than those assumed by absent class action
95. See id.
96. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
97. Burger King, - U.S. at -_, 105 S. Ct. at 2184 (emphasis in the original). This
is not to suggest that the Court was referring to parent-subsidiary relations. The
Court appears to indicate, by this statement, that unilateral activity of another party
or third person will not constitute a "contact" of the defendant with the forum state.
Id. at 2183.
98. See supra notes 10-14, 32-34 and accompanying text.
99. - U.S. -, 105 S. Ct. 2965 (1985).
100. Id. at 2968.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 2975.
103. Id. The Supreme Court, in Phillips, held that minimal due process requires
that the plaintiffs be given notice plus an opportunity to be heard and to participate
in the litigation as well as an opportunity to remove themselves from the class. Id. In
addition the named plaintiff must at all times adequately represent the interests of
the absent class members. Id.
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plaintiffs. 0 4 Therefore, the Court determined that the due
process clause requires courts to afford greater protection to
an out-of-state defendant than to absent class action plain-
tiffs. '0 5
B. Lower Court Decisions That Apply the Jurisdictional Standards
Set Forth in United States Supreme Court Precedent
When deciding whether to assert jurisdiction over alien
corporations that have United States subsidiaries, lower fed-
eral courts have inconsistently interpreted the jurisdictional
standards established by the Supreme Court. 1"6 The problem
of obtaining jurisdiction over alien corporations arises in many
different contexts, including torts involving personal injury,10 7
104. Id. at 2973. The out-of-state defendant must hire counsel and travel to the
forum to defend himself from the plaintiff's claims or suffer a default judgment. Id.
Such a defendant might be forced to participate in lengthy and costly discovery and
might be forced to respond in money damages or comply with some other form of
remedy if he loses the suit. Id.
105. Id. The Court, in Phillips, also addressed the standing of the defendant to
assert the claim that the Kansas court did not possess jurisdiction over certain class
members as well as the applicable choice of law. Id. at 2971-72 (standing), id. at
2977-81 (choice of law). The Court held that the defendant did have standing to
assert this claim because the defendant had a personal interest in having the plaintiff
class bound by res judicata. Id. at 2972. As to the issue of the applicable choice of
law, the Court held that the Supreme Court of Kansas erred in ruling that Kansas law
was applicable to all the transactions that it sought to adjudicate. Id. at 2981. The
Court determined that for a Kansas court to apply its law to the claims of each mem-
ber of the plaintiff class, that state must have a "significant aggregation of contacts"
to each claim. id. at 2980. These contacts had to create sufficient state interest to
ensure that the choice of Kansas law was not arbitrary or unfair. Id. (citing Allstate
Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 312-13, reh'g denied, 450 U.S. 971 (1981)). The
Court found that Kansas did not have a sufficient interest in the claims that were
unrelated to that state, and concluded that the application of Kansas law to every
claim was arbitrary and unfair, thereby exceeding constitutional limits. Id.
106. A federal court in a diversity action must apply the law of the state in which
it sits to determine questions of personal jurisdiction. See Insurance Corp. of Ireland
v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 711 (1982) (Powell, J., concur-
ring); Arrowsmith v. United Press Int'l., 320 F.2d 219 (2d Cir. 1963). See generally,
Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). In cases in which federal court jurisdic-
tion is based on a federal question, except in cases involving a United States statute
that provides for service of a summons, service may be made under the circumstances
and in the manner prescribed by the statute or rules, if there are any, of the state in
which the court sits. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(e).
107. See, e.g., Hargrave v. Fibreboard Corp., 710 F.2d 1154 (5th Cir. 1983);
Weight v. Kawasaki Motor Corp., 604 F. Supp. 968 (E.D. Va. 1985); Samuels v.
B.M.W. of N. Am., Inc., 554 F. Supp. 1191 (E.D. Tex. 1983).
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torts involving business injuries, 0 8  patent infringement
suits,' 0 9 antitrust," t0 and cases under the Internal Revenue
Code."' The following discussion will first address actions in-
volving personal injury, and then actions involving business re-
lated injuries." 2
108. See, e.g., Bulova Watch Co. v. K. Hattori & Co., 508 F. Supp. 1322 (E.D.N.Y.
1981).
109. See, e.g., Brunswick Corp. v. Suzuki Motor Co., 575 F. Supp. 1412 (E.D.
Wis. 1983); Graco, Inc. v. Kremlin, Inc., 558 F. Supp. 188 (N.D. Ill. 1982).
110. See, e.g., United States v. Scophony Corp., 333 U.S. 795 (1948); O.S.C.
Corp. v. Toshiba Am., Inc., 491 F.2d 1064 (9th Cir. 1974) (per curiam); Akzona Inc.
v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 607 F. Supp. 227 (D. Del. 1984); see supra notes 51-
57 and accompanying text.
111. See, e.g., United States v. Toyota Motors Corp., 561 F. Supp. 354 (C.D. Cal.
1983) (discussed supra note 57).
112. There is no simple way to divide lower court decisions because the jurisdic-
tional standards of each state are slightly different. Courts usually assert jurisdiction
over alien corporations by way of state long arm statutes, which vary from state to
state. See, e.g., Brunswick, 575 F. Supp. at 1421; Kawasaki, 604 F. Supp. at 968; Copiers,
576 F. Supp. at 321; see also Hargrave, 710 F.2d at 1158 (third party plaintiff asserted
that court had jurisdiction over United Kingdom corporation under state long arm
statute); Samuels, 554 F. Supp. at 1192 (plaintiff asserted that court had jurisdiction
over West German corporation under state long arm statute). For a definition of
long arm statutes, see supra note 66.
Whether a court exercises jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant by way of a
state long arm statute, or by other means, the exercise of jurisdiction must comply
with the requirements of the due process clause in order to be valid. See Volkswagen,
444 U.S. at 291 (citing Kulko v. California Superior Court, 436 U.S. at 91). For a
discussion of Kulko, see supra note 71. For examples of a court's ability to exercise
jurisdiction over an alien corporation without reliance on a long arm statute, see, e.g.,
Graco, 558 F. Supp. at 192; Bulova Watch, 508 F. Supp. at 1344-45 (doing business
doctrine).
A state may have a greater interest in adjudicating actions involving personal
injuries to their citizens than those involving business related injuries. Copiers, 576 F.
Supp. at 321. In a typical personal injury case the plaintiff is an individual who may
have limited financial resources, and therefore would find it difficult to go out of state
to bring suit. See McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957).
"When claims [are] small or moderate, individual claimants frequently [cannot] af-
ford the cost of bringing an action in a foreign forum-thus in effect making the
company judgment proof." Id. While the action in McGee was to recover a judgment
against an insurance company on a life insurance policy, the rationale is equally ap-
plicable to personal injury suits. See Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 302-03 (Brennan,J., dis-
senting). Justice Brennan stated:
As in McGee, a resident forced to travel to a distant State to prosecute an
action against someone who has injured him could, for lack of funds, be
entirely unable to bring the cause of action. The plaintiff's residence in the
State makes the State one of a very few convenient forums for a personal
injury case.
Id. In contrast, the typical plaintiff in an action for business related damages is a
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In a recent case, Weight v. Kawasaki Motors Corp., U.S.A.,113
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Vir-
ginia held that it had personal jurisdiction over an alien corpo-
ration' 14 under the state's long arm statute. 1 5 In Kawasaki, a
Virginia resident brought a products liability suit against ajap-
anese corporation and its ninety-six percent owned United
States subsidiary for personal injuries arising out of an alleg-
edly defective motorcycle. 1 6 While there were no direct con-
tacts between the defendant parent corporation and the fo-
rum, 17 the court found that the parent corporation had indi-
rect contacts with the state through its subsidiary, which sold
Kawasaki motorcycles to nineteen retail dealers in Virginia. 18
The court held these contacts sufficient for the parent corpora-
tion to reasonably expect to be haled into a Virginia court. 19
The holding in Kawasaki was not based on the existence of
an agency relationship between the two corporations nor did
the court attempt to pierce the corporate veil.12 0  Instead, the
court cited dicta from Volkswagen to support its exercise of ju-
risdiction.1 2 ' The court stated that the parent corporation
corporation that has more financial resources at its disposal than would an individual
plaintiff.
113. 604 F. Supp. 968 (E.D. Va. 1985).
114. Id. at 971.
115. VA. CODE § 8.01-328.1 (1984). The court does not indicate which subsec-
tion of the long arm statute it used to find jurisdiction over the defendant. The court
did discuss the defendant's business activities in some detail, however, and the opin-
ion seemed to imply that jurisdiction arose under subsection A(l) of the long arm
statute, which addresses the transaction of business within the Virginia Common-
wealth. See Kawasaki, 604 F. Supp. at 970-71. There is also the possibility ofjurisdic-
tion under subsection 3 of the statute, which states that a court may exercise jurisdic-
tion over a person who causes tortious injury by an act or omission in the Common-
wealth, or subsection 4, which states that a court may exercise jurisdiction over a
person who causes tortious injury in the Commonwealth by an act or omission from
without. VA. CODE § 8.01-328.1(A)(3), (4) (1984).
116. Kawasaki, 604 F. Supp. at 969-70.
117. See id. at 969. Examples of direct contacts between a parent corporation
and the forum would be the registration or licensing of the corporation to do busi-
ness in the state, or the parent's establishment of an office there. See id.
118. Id. at 970. It appears that the subsidiary was not incorporated in Virginia.
119. Id. at 971.
120. The court did mention, however, that one person served on the board of
directors of both corporations. Id. at 970.
121. Id. at 970. The Kawasaki court quoted Volkswagen for the proposition:
If the sale of a product of a manufacturer or distributor ... is not simply an
isolated occurrence, but arises from the efforts of the manufacturer or dis-
tributor to serve, directly or indirectly, the market for its products in other
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knew and intended that many of its motorcycles would be
purchased by consumers in Virginia, and these sales could lead
to consequences in that state. 122 The court also stressed that
the parent corporation received substantial economic benefit
from the sale of its motorcycles by its subsidiary. 12  Even
though the parent did not send the product directly into Vir-
ginia; the court found that the parent could reasonably foresee
that marketing by its subsidiary would cause the product to
reach Virginia. 24 The court concluded that jurisdiction over
the parent was reasonable. 2
5
Not all courts have followed the reasoning of the Kawasaki
court regarding jurisdiction over alien parent corporations.
Texas has a long arm statute 126 similar to Virginia's statute,
which provides for jurisdiction over nonresidents doing busi-
ness in the state. 127 The Texas statute defines doing business
as including the commission of a tort within the state. 128 The
United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit ap-
plied the Texas statute in Hargrave v. Fibreboard Corp. ,129 in an
action alleging injury from exposure to asbestos insulation,
and held that it did not have jurisdiction over the publicly-
owned United Kingdom corporation. 130
States, it is not unreasonable to subject it to suit in one of those states if its
allegedly defective merchandise has there been the source of injury to its
owners or to others. The forum State does not exceed its powers under the
Due Process Clause if it asserts personal jurisdiction over a corporation that
delivers its products into the stream of commerce with the expectation that
they will be purchased by consumers in the forum State.
Id. (citing Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297). The court also cited the Supreme Court's
holding in Volkswagen. Id. at 971.
122. Id. at 970.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 970-71.
125. Id. at 971.
126. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2031(b) (Vernon 1964 & Supp. 1982-1983)
(current version at TEx. CIv. PRACTICE & REMEDIES CODE ANN. §§ 17.041-45
(Vernon 1985)).
127. Id. § 3 (current version at § 17.044).
128. Id. § 4 (current version at § 17.042(2)).
129. 710 F.2d 1154 (5th Cir.), modified on other grounds, No. 82-2231, 82-2236,
slip op. (5th Cir. Nov. 3, 1983).
130. Id. at 1161. The United Kingdom corporation, Turner & Newall, Ltd.
(T&N), was a third-party defendant in Hargrave. The third-party plaintiff, Nicolet,
Inc. (Nicolet), asserted that the court had personal jurisdiction over T&N as a result
of the torts of Keasby & Mattism Co. (K&M), a Pennsylvania corporation which oper-
ated as a wholly-owned subsidiary of T&N from 1936-62. Id. at 1156-57. K&M,
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In Hargrave, the court stated that it was willing to assume
that the subsidiary's activity in Texas would be subject to the
reach of the Texas long arm statute.' 3' However, the court
still required the third party plaintiff to demonstrate that the
subsidiary's activities could properly be imputed to its par-
ent. 132 Relying on Cannon Manufacturing Co. v. Cudahy Packing
Co. ,33 the court stated that as long as a parent and its subsidi-
ary maintain distinct corporate entities, the presence of one in
a state may not be attributed to the other.'34  Before viewing
the two corporations as one for jurisdictional purposes, courts
in the Fifth Circuit have required plaintiffs to prove that the
parent corporation had control over the internal business op-
erations and affairs of the subsidiary. 35 The court in Hargrave
did not find such control by the parent. 3 6
A distinction between Kawasaki and Hargrave is that the lat-
ter case did not involve a parent corporation using a subsidiary
to deliver its products into the stream of commerce. Neverthe-
less, the court in Hargrave could have argued, as did the court
in Kawasaki,13 7 that the parent corporation had derived eco-
which was dissolved in 1967, had sold some of its asbestos manufacturing facilities to
Nicolet in 1962. Id. at 1156. After being made a defendant to this suit, Nicolet
brought a third-party complaint against T&N seeking a declaratory judgment that
T&N was liable for any and all injuries arising from the plaintiff's exposure to asbes-
tos products manufactured by K&M. Id. at 1156.
131. Id. at 1159.
132. Id.
133. 267 U.S. 333 (1925); see supra notes 38-47 and accompanying text.
134. Hargrave, 710 F.2d at 1160.
135. Id.; see, e.g., Walker v. Newgent, 583 F.2d 163, 167 (5th Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 441 U.S. 906 (1979); Products Promotions, Inc. v. Cousteau, 495 F.2d 483,
493 (5th Cir. 1974). The court, in Hargrave, explained that "[t]he Lone Star of Texas
may shine brightly throughout the world, but its long arm is not judicially all encom-
passing." Hargrave, 710 F.2d at 1161.
136. Hargrave, 710 F.2d at 1161. Some factors that influenced the court's deci-
sion that the parent did not control the subsidiary were that the companies shared no
common officers, never had more than one common director, and the two companies
"scrupulously observed" corporate formalities. Id. at 1160. While the parent, T&N,
had complete authority over the general policy decisions of its subsidiary, K&M, in-
cluding selection of product lines, hiring and firing of the officers of K&M, and ap-
proval of sizable capital investments, the day-to-day business and operational deci-
sions were made by K&M officers. Id.
137. Compare Hargrave, 710 F.2d at 1160, with Kawasaki, 604 F. Supp. at 970.
The subsidiary in Hargrave manufactured products in the United States from raw
materials supplied by the parent, rather than acting as a distributor for the parent's
foreign made products, as the subsidiary did in Kawasaki. Hargrave, 710 F.2d at 1160;
Kawasaki, 604 F. Supp. at 970. The court, in Hargrave, did not, however, discuss this
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nomic benefits from the forum state's market and had received
protection from that state's laws. 3 ' Instead, the Hargrave
court asserted that there was nothing improper about the par-
ent profiting from the business of its subsidiary unless it could
be shown that the benefits the parent derived from the subsidi-
ary were a result of a misuse of the corporate form.'
39
In Samuels v. B.M. W. of North America, Inc.,4' the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas ad-
dressed a factual situation almost identical to the one in Kawa-
saki. The plaintiff, in Samuels, brought an action against a West
German auto manufacturer, Bayerische Motoren Werke, A.G.
(Bayerische), and its wholly-owned United States marketing
subsidiary, B.M.W. of North America (BMW). 4 ' The plaintiff
sued for personal injuries that he claimed were caused by an
automobile produced by defendant corporation. 42 The court
held that it did not have jurisdiction over the alien parent cor-
poration under the Texas long arm statute, 43 even though a
tort had allegedly been committed within the state. 144 The
only contacts between the parent corporation and the forum
were through the subsidiary, BMW. 1 5 The court concluded
that, absent some other contact, under the Cannon doctrine it
did not have jurisdiction over the West German corpora-
tion. 146
In Samuels, the court was willing to assume that if a tort
had been committed it was committed by both the parent and
the subsidiary, 47 but the court refused to take jurisdiction over
factor in its decision to dismiss the complaint against the alien parent. Therefore it
would be difficult to argue that Hargrave can be distinguished from Kawasaki on this
basis alone.
138. See Kawasaki, 604 F. Supp. at 970.
139. Hargrave, 710 F.2d at 1162. Furthermore, the court stated that the parent
had done nothing more "nefarious" than to demonstrate a parent corporation's
proper interest and involvement. Id.
140. 554 F. Supp. 1191 (E.D. Tex. 1983).
141. Id. at 1192.
142. Id. The personal injuries included the death of a passenger. Id.
143. See supra notes 126-28 and accompanying text.
144. Samuels, 554 F. Supp. at 1195.
145. Id. at 1193.
146. Id. While the court did not address the possibility of an agency or alter-ego
relationship between Bayerische and BMW, it did find that BMW was "autonomous."
Id. at 1194.
147. Id. at 1193.
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the parent.148 The rationale was based in part on the court's
finding that jurisdiction over the parent was not necessary to
satisfy the forum state's interest in having the dispute adjudi-
cated in Texas. 49 Here, the forum state's interests were satis-
fied because BMW, the distributor and warrantor of the auto-
mobile, had not challenged the court's exercise of jurisdic-
tion. ° In addition, because BMW appeared to be a profitable
and solvent firm, the plaintiff's interest in obtaining conve-
nient and effective relief had also been satisfied.1 5' Unless the
plaintiff could show that the parent, Bayerische, was a neces-
sary party, its presence in the suit would increase the costs to
the defendant without benefiting the plaintiff, and would delay
a resolution of the suit. 152 The court concluded that asserting
jurisdiction over Bayerische would be an unreasonable viola-
tion of due process.15 1
Graco, Inc. v. Kremlin, Inc. 154 involved a cause of action for
patent infringement.' 51 Here, the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Illinois held that the exercise of
personal jurisdiction over a French corporation, SKM, 156 was
consistent with due process because the defendant's conduct
and connection with the forum state were such that it should
reasonably anticipate being haled into court there.'57
The alien corporation's only contact with the state, in
148. Id. at 1195. The court relied on Volkswagen, stating:
It is not the presence of a product in the forum that satisfies the due process
requirements of asserting jurisdiction over a foreign defendant. Rather, the
relationship between the defendant and the forum must be such that it is rea-
sonable ... to require the corporation to defend the particular suit which is
brought there.
Id. at 1193 (emphasis in original) (quoting Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 291).
149. Id. at 1194. The court, in Samuels, stated that when the reasonableness of
requiring a foreign defendant to defend is less than adequate on its face, a court
should consider the four factors set out in Volkswagen. Id. at 1193-94. One of these
factors is the forum state's interest in having a dispute adjudicated there. See supra
notes 70-72 and accompanying text.
150. Samuels, 554 F. Supp. at 1194.
151. Id.
152. Id. As the distributor of Bayerische's autos in the United States, the court
found that BMW alone was the natural and logical defendant in this case. Id.
153. Id.
154. 558 F. Supp. 188 (N.D. Ill. 1982).
155. Graco, Inc. v. Kremlin, Inc., 558 F. Supp. at 189.
156. SKM appears to be the formal name of the French corporation. See id. at
189.
157. Id. at 193 (quoting Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297).
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Graco, was through its wholly-owned subsidiary, Kremlin, Inc.
(Kremlin), which was incorporated and doing business in
Illinois.' 58 The court examined the relationship between the
parent and its subsidiary, and specifically found that Kremlin
had acted as an independent corporate entity, free from do-
minion by SKM.' 59 Therefore, personal jurisdiction over SKM
could not be based on its relationship with Kremlin. 160 Never-
theless, the court held that it did have jurisdiction over SKM
under the doing business doctrine' 6' because SKM's products
regularly entered the state through its United States subsidi-
ary.' 6 2 The court also noted that by establishing a subsidiary
158. Id. at 189-90.
159. Id. at 191.
160. Id. The court also found that the parent, SKM, had not held Kremlin out as
its agent. Id.
161. Id. at 193. In Illinois the doctrine of doing business is one of general juris-
diction. Id. at 192 n.10. Therefore, when a corporation is found to be doing busi-
ness in the state, it is amenable to service as a resident corporation under 13.3 of
the Civil Practice Act, ILL. REV. STAT., ch. 110 (1977) (current version at ILL. STAT.
ANN., ch. 110 2-204 (West 1983 & Supp. 1985)). See Graco, 558 F. Supp. at 192
n.10. The court, in Graco, stated that it was unnecessary to decide whether jurisdic-
tion over the parent could be found under the Illinois long arm statute, ILL. REV.
STAT., ch. 110 17(l)(b) (1977) (current version at ILL. STAT. ANN., ch. 110 2-
209(a)(2) (West 1983)), which grants jurisdiction over non-resident defendants who
have committed a tortious act within the state, because the court was able to find that
jurisdiction existed under the doctrine of doing business. Graco, 558 F. Supp. at 192.
162. Graco, 558 F. Supp. at 192. The seminal case that stands for the proposi-
tion that a court can find jurisdiction over a corporation whose products regularly
enter the forum is Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 Ill. 2d
432, 176 N.E.2d 761 (1961) (cited favorably by the Supreme Court in Volkswagen, 444
U.S. at 298, in support of the "stream of commerce" theory). Gray was a products
liability case involving a claim for personal injuries, as was Volkswagen. In Gray, an
Illinois resident sued an out-of-state corporation, Titan Valve Mfg. Co. (Titan), and
others, for injuries sustained when a water heater allegedly exploded. Id. at 434, 176
N.E.2d at 762. Titan moved to dismiss on the grounds that it did not commit a
tortious act in the state of Illinois because it did not do business there. Id. Titan
manufactured a safety valve in Ohio that was incorporated in the hot water heater in
Pennsylvania. The heater was then sold to consumers in Illinois. Id. at 438, 176
N.E.2d at 764. The Supreme Court of Illinois held that Titan was subject to the
jurisdiction of the Illinois courts, stating that "if a corporation elects to sell its prod-
ucts for ultimate use in another State, it is not unjust to hold it answerable there for
any damage caused by defects in those products." Id. at 442, 176 N.E.2d at 766.
It is questionable, under Gray, whether jurisdiction based on the stream of com-
merce theory is applicable to cases involving business losses, or whether it is limited
to personal injury suits. Compare Allen, 599 F. Supp. at 389 n.10 (stream of commerce
theory is only applicable to tort claims for personal injury) and Dejames v. Magnifi-
cence Carriers, Inc., 654 F.2d 280, 285 (3d Cir. 1981) (stream of commerce theory
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in the state, 163 SKM intended to market its products there and
had derived substantial revenue from sales by Kremlin in
Illinois. 16
4
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Wisconsin followed similar reasoning in another action alleg-
ing patent infringement. In Brunswick Corp. v. Suzuki Motor Co.,
Ltd. ,165 the district court did not investigate whether it was pos-
sible to pierce the corporate veil between the Japanese corpo-
rate defendants, Hitachi Ltd. (Hitachi) and Mitsubishi Electric
Corporation (MELCO), and their subsidiaries. 166 Instead, the
court determined that, under International Shoe Co. v. Washing-
ton 167, it could consider a non-resident's contacts with the fo-
rum state through its wholly-owned subsidiaries, without re-
gard to whether the affiliated corporations have maintained a
formal separation of corporate identities.
168
was developed as a means of sustaining jurisdiction in products liability cases) with
Copiers, 576 F. Supp. at 319-20.
In Copiers, the court used the stream of commerce theory to help support the
exercise of jurisdiction over an alien corporation in an action for business-related
injuries. Id. The court stated that even though a state's interests are greater with
personal injuries, states are certainly concerned about protecting economic interests
of local businesses. Id. at 321; see also Toyota, 561 F. Supp. at 359 (citing the stream of
commerce theory to support jurisdiction in an action to enforce an IRS summons on
an alien corporation).
163. Graco, 558 F. Supp. at 189. One could distinguish the court's findings of
jurisdiction over the defendant in Graco, from the refusal of the courts in Hargrave or
Samuels to take jurisdiction, because the subsidiary in Graco was incorporated in the
forum state, whereas this was not the case in either Hargrave or Samuels. Compare
Graco, 558 F. Supp. at 189 with Hargrave, 710 F.2d at 1156 (subsidiary was a Penn-
sylvania corporation in Texas forum) and Samuels, 554 F. Supp. at 1194 (subsidiary
was a Delaware corporation in Texas forum). However, the subsidiary in Kawasaki
was also not incorporated in the forum, yet the court found jurisdiction over the
parent corporation in that case. Kawasaki, 604 F. Supp. at 971. In addition, none of
these courts mentioned the state of the subsidiary's incorporation as being a relevant
factor in their decisions.
164. Graco, 558 F. Supp. at 193.
165. 575 F. Supp. 1412 (E.D. Wis. 1983).
166. See generally Brunswick Corp. v. Suzuki Motor Co., 575 F. Supp. 1412 (E.D.
Wis. 1983). It appears that none of the defendants' subsidiaries were incorporated in
Wisconsin. See id. at 1415-16.
167. 326 U.S. 310 (1945) (discussed supra notes 48-50, 61-62 and accompanying
text).
168. Brunswick, 575 F. Supp. at 1419. This holding directly conflicts with the
United States Supreme Court's decision in Cannon Mfg. Co. v. Cudahy Packing Co.,
267 U.S. 333 (1925). See supra notes 38-47 and accompanying text. The Brunswick
court did discuss the Cannon doctrine, but found that in light of International Shoe and
its progeny, reliance on Cannon and the alter-ego principles of corporation law were
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The court held that it had jurisdiction over the Japanese
parent corporations under the doing business provision of the
Wisconsin long arm statute, 69 which gives a court general ju-
risdiction over a defendant.17 0  The court based its holding
solely on the business contacts between the subsidiaries and
the state,' 71 even though neither Hitachi's nor MELCO's sub-
sidiaries were related to the subject matter of the patent
suit. 172 The court determined that, while the relationship be-
tween the defendants' contacts with the state and the cause of
action was important, it would not be the controlling crite-
ria. ' 73
no longer relevant to the constitutional inquiry into whether an exercise of jurisdic-
tion over a non-resident offends traditional notions of fair play. Id. at 1419-20. For
further discussion and a critique on this view, see supra notes 59-61 and accompany-
ing text.
169. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 801.05(1)(d) (West 1977). This subsection gives the
court jurisdiction over a person served where he is engaged in "substantial and not
isolated activities within the state." Id.
170. WIs. STAT. ANN. § 801.05(1) (revision notes) (West 1977). When jurisdic-
tion rests upon one of the grounds stated in subsection one of the long-arm statute, it
is immaterial that the cause of action arose outside of Wisconsin. Id.
171. Brunswick, 575 F. Supp. at 1421. The parent corporations had no direct
contact with Wisconsin at all. See id. at 1415. Defendants Hitachi Ltd. (Hitachi) and
Mitsubishi Electric Corporation (MELCO) manufactured the motor ignition systems
in Japan that were alleged to infringe the plaintiff's patents. Id. The two defendant
corporations sold these ignition systems, in Japan, to another Japanese corporation,
Suzuki Motor, which incorporated them into outboard motors that it manufactured
in Japan. Id. Some of these motors were sold in Japan to U.S. Suzuki, a subsidiary of
Suzuki Motor, which imported the motors into California. Id. Eventually some of
these motors reached Wisconsin and were sold to the public. Id.
172. See id. at 1421-23. The defendants argued that they could not reasonably
have anticipated being sued in Wisconsin for patent infringement of devices whose
sales they did not purposely promote in that state or anywhere in the United States.
Id. at 1422. The court rejected this argument, stressing the defendant's overall rela-
tionship with the forum state through their subsidiaries. Id.
173. Id. This statement seems to conflict with the Supreme Court's assertion
that the " 'relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation' is the
essential foundation of in personam jurisdiction." Helicopteros Nacionales de Co-
lombia S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 (1984) (quoting Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S.
186, 204 (1977)); see supra notes 80-81 and accompanying text. However, since the
doing business provision of the Wisconsin long arm statute, WIs. STAT. ANN.
§ 801.05(1)(d) (West 1977), gives a court general jurisdiction over a defendant, a
different standard for a court's exercise of personal jurisdiction applies. See
Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 414-16 (citing Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342
U.S. at 438, 445). For an assertion of general jurisdiction to be constitutionally valid,
the defendant must have "systematic and continuous" contacts with the forum state.
Id. at 416; see supra notes 83-84 and accompanying text.
In Brunswick, the parent corporation had no direct contacts with the forum state.
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Two cases brought against Toshiba Corporation, Allen v.
Toshiba Corp. 174 and Copiers Typewriters Calculators, Inc. v. Toshiba
Corp. ,tT demonstrate that courts can arrive at different conclu-
sions under similar facts. Toshiba Corporation (Toshiba) is a
Japanese corporation that manufactures, among other things,
photocopiers, and does business in the United States through
its wholly-owned subsidiary, Toshiba America, Inc. (TAI), a
New York corporation.' 76  Both suits involved business torts
and other business related charges.1 77 In both instances, the
only contact Toshiba had with the forum state was through its
subsidiaries. 178 In Allen, the United States District Court for
See Brunswick, 575 F. Supp. at 1415. Therefore, under Helicopteros, it could be argued
that the court's assertion of jurisdiction in Brunswick was constitutionally invalid. See
Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 414-16. Although the Brunswick court did not address the
"continuous and systematic" test, it is likely that the court would have found that the
subsidiary's contact with the forum provided the continuous and systematic contacts
that were necessary, even though the contacts were those of the subsidiary and not
the parent. See Brunswick, 575 F. Supp. at 1419. "This Court believes that the consti-
tutional analysis under International Shoe permits consideration of a non-resident's
contacts with the forum state through its wholly-owned subsidiaries without regard to
whether the affiliated corporations have maintained a formal separation of corporate
identities." Id.
174. 599 F. Supp. 381 (D.N.M. 1984).
175. 576 F. Supp. 312 (D. Md. 1983).
176. See Copiers, 576 F. Supp. at 316; Allen, 599 F. Supp. at 386-87. Toshiba
America, Inc. (TAI), the subsidiary, purchased photocopiers from its parent, Toshiba
Corporation (Toshiba), F.O.B. Japan. Copiers, 576 F. Supp. at 316; see Allen, 599 F.
Supp. at 383.
Neither of these suits took place in the state in which TAI was incorporated (New
York), nor where its principal office was located (NewJersey), so the state of incorpo-
ration is not a factor that separates or explains the difference in these decisions.
177. In Allen the charges were, inter alia, breach of warranty and fraudulent mis-
representation. Allen, 599 F. Supp. at 383. In Copiers the charges were, inter alia,
breach of contract, negligence, breach of warranty and fraudulent and negligent mis-
representation. Copiers, 576 F. Supp. at 315. Jurisdiction, or the lack of it, was based
in each case on transaction of business provisions of the long arm statute of the re-
spective states, rather than on tort provisions of the statutes. See Copiers, 576 F. Supp.
at 321; Allen, 599 F. Supp. at 388. The court, in Copiers, based jurisdiction on the
section of Maryland's long arm statute referring to the defendant's transaction of
business in the state, MD. CTS. &JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 6-103(b)(1) (Michie 1984).
Copiers, 576 F. Supp. at 321. The court, inAllen, held that it did not have jurisdiction
over the defendant. Allen, 599 F. Supp. at 392. In so holding, the court referred to
the section of the New Mexico long arm statute which provides a court jurisdiction
over a defendant that transacts any business within the state, N.M. STAT. ANN. § 38-1-
16(A)(l) (Michie 1978). Allen, 599 F. Supp. at 388.
178. See Allen, 599 F. Supp. at 386; Copiers, 576 F. Supp. at 316. Toshiba, the
parent, was not licensed to do business in either New Mexico or Maryland, nor did it
own or lease any real property or maintain any bank accounts, offices, employees or
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the District of New Mexico held that it did not have jurisdiction
over the parent corporation because the plaintiff was unable to
establish that TAI was an alter-ego of Toshiba, or that there
was an agency relationship between the two corporations.'7 9
Although the defendant's subsidiary did business with the
state, the contacts were not sufficient to sustain jurisdiction
over the parent corporation under the Cannon doctrine.18 0
Under similar facts, the court in Copiers reached the oppo-
site conclusion of the Allen court.'' In Copiers, the court deter-
mined that when Toshiba manufactured its copiers for sale in
the United States, it performed a "forum-related act."'' 8 2 By
placing its goods into the stream of commerce, the corporation
should have reasonably anticipated being haled into court in
any state where its goods were sold and had injured some-
one. 8 3 Furthermore, the court found that Toshiba purposely
availed itself of the privileges and immunities of Maryland's
laws by selling its goods in the state and receiving substantial
revenues from those sales."8 4 The court held that its exercise
ofjurisdiction over Toshiba under the Maryland long arm stat-
ute was therefore reasonable and proper. 8 5 The court did not
discuss the existence of an agency relationship between the
two corporations or factors relating to the alter-ego theory.'8 6
places for the regular conduct of business in either state. See Allen, 599 F. Supp. at
386; Copiers, 576 F. Supp. at 316.
179. See Allen, 599 F. Supp. at 390-92.
180. See id. at 391. The court also asserted that as a general rule "a foreign
corporation is not subject to the jurisdiction of the forum state merely because its
subsidiary is present or doing business there." Allen, 599 F. Supp. at 389 (quoting
Hargrave, 710 F.2d at 1159).
181. See Copiers, 576 F. Supp. at 320.
182. Id. at 319.
183. Id. at 320 (citing Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297). For a comparison of the
applicability of the stream of commerce theory in cases involving personal injury,
with cases involving business losses, see supra note 162.
184. Id. at 320.
185. Id. at 321. The Copiers court held that it had jurisdiction over Toshiba
under the subsection of the Maryland long arm statute that gives a court jurisdiction
over a person who directly, or by an agent transacts, any business or performs any
work in the state. MD. CTS. &JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 6-103(b)(1) (Michie 1984).
Copiers, 576 F. Supp. at 321.
186. See generally Copiers Calculators Typewriters, Inc. v. Toshiba Corp., 576 F.
Supp. 312 (D. Md. 1983). The court did discuss some factors that tend to negate an
inference of an alter-ego relationship between the parent and the subsidiary. For
example, the court noted that Toshiba did not conduct business from its subsidiary's
facilities, had no common directors, and did not maintain joint bank accounts with it.
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The concept of agency and the alter-ego doctrine formed
the bases of the traditional New York approach to jurisdiction
over alien corporations that have subsidiaries doing business
in the state.'8 7  One variation of this approach was Bulova
Watch Co. Inc. v. K Hattori & Co., Ltd. ,"8' a case involving alle-
gations of unfair competition.'8 9 The defendant in Bulova, K.
Hattori & Co., Ltd. (Hattori) was a Japanese corporation with
its principal offices in Tokyo. 190 Its primary connection with
the forum state, New York, was through its subsidiaries.'
In Bulova, the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of New York found two possible predicates for jurisdic-
tion over Hattori: the state's long arm statute, which provides
for jurisdiction when a defendant has committed a tortious act
in-state, or out-of-state with in-state consequences,1 92 and the
Id. at 316-17. The court did, however, mention that TAI used Toshiba's trademark,
and implied that Toshiba and TAI held themselves out to the public as one corpora-
tion. Id. at 320.
187. See, e.g., Taca Int'l Airlines, S.A. v. Rolls-Royce of England, Ltd., 15 N.Y.2d
97, 102, 204 N.E.2d 329, 331, 256 N.Y.S.2d 129, 132 (1965) (alien corporation is
considered to be doing business in New York if its affiliated company is in effect a
local department separately incorporated); Frummer v. Hilton Hotels Int'l, Inc., 19
N.Y.2d 533, 537, 227 N.E.2d 851, 854, 281 N.Y.S.2d 41, 44 (alien corporation does
business in New York if the affiliated company acts as an agent for the parent), cert.
denied, 389 U.S. 923 (1967).
188. 508 F. Supp. 1322 (E.D.N.Y. 1981). For a detailed analysis of this case, see
Comment, Jurisdiction Over a Foreign Corporation on the Basis of its Subsidiary's Activities in
New York: Bulova Watch Co. v. K. Hattori & Co., 9 BROOKLYNJ. INT'L L. 91 (1983).
189. Bulova, 508 F. Supp. at 1329. In this action the plaintiff, Bulova Watch Co.
charged K. Hattori & Co. (Hattori), and certain individual defendants with unfair
competition, disparagement and conspiracy to raid plaintiff's marketing staff in order
to appropriate the plaintiff's trade secrets. Id. The damages were for business losses
rather than personal injury. See id.
190. Id.
191. See id. The defendant, Hattori, owned all of the stock of Seiko Corporation
of America (SCA), a New York corporation. SCA owned all of the stock of Seiko
Time Corporation, Pulsar Time, Inc. and SPD Precision, Inc., all New York corpora-
tions. Hattori contracted in Japan for the manufacture of its watches and sold them
under the Seiko, Pulsar and other brand names to its three American sub-subsidiar-
ies. Id. at 1329. Hattori may have had ties with New York other than those estab-
lished by its subsidiaries, but the court did not discuss any, except in relation to one
of Hattori's officers, Moriya. See infra note 196.
192. N.Y. Civ. PRAC. L-Aw § 302(a)(2), (3) (McKinney 1972); see Bulova, 508 F.
Supp. at 1345-47. The court held that it could exercise jurisdiction over Hattori
under section (a)(2) of the long arm statute, N.Y. Civ. PRAC. LAW § 302(a)(2) (McKin-
ney 1972), which provides for jurisdiction over a defendant that commits a tortious
act in New York. Bulova, 508 F. Supp. at 1347. In addition, the court found that it
had jurisdiction over the defendant under section (a)(1) of the long arm statute, N.Y.
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doing business doctrine. 93 The court found that while the
case presented a factual pattern that did not meet the require-
ments of either the doing business doctrine or the long arm
statute, a combination of the two categories could cover the
claims asserted. 19
4
After taking judicial notice of multinational operations in
general and the Japanese hierarchical corporate structure in
particular, 195 the court examined the relationships between the
parent and its subsidiaries. 196 The court held that when a sub-
CIv. PRAC. LAw § 302(a)(1) (McKinney 1972 and Supp.), which gives New York
courts jurisdiction over a defendant that transacts business in the state. Bulova, 508
F. Supp. at 1345-47. The plaintiff had also alleged that the court had jurisdiction
over Hattori under section (a)(3) of the long arm statute, N.Y. Civ. Pi.c. IAw
§ 302(a)(3) (McKinney 1972). Bulova, 508 F. Supp. at 1347. The court did not de-
cide this issue, however, because it had found that jurisdiction over the defendant
existed under sections 301 (discussed infra note 193 and accompanying text),
302(a)(1) and 302(a)(2) of the New York Civil Practice Law. Bulova, 508 F. Supp. at
1347.
193. See Bulova, 508 F. Supp. at 1326. The doing business doctrine is embodied
in section 301 of the New York Civil Practice Law, which states that "[a] court may
exercise such jurisdiction over person, property, or status as might have been exer-
cised heretofore." N.Y. CIv. PRAC. LAw § 301 (McKinney 1972). Section 301 confers
personal jurisdiction over unlicensed foreign and alien corporations that are doing
business in New York. See Simonson v. Int'l Bank, 14 N.Y.2d 281, 200 N.E.2d 427,
251 N.Y.S.2d 433 (1964); Bryant v. Finnish Nat'l Airline, 15 N.Y.2d 426, 208 N.E.2d
439, 260 N.Y.S.2d 625 (1965).
194. Bulova, 508 F. Supp. at 1327.
195. Id. at 1335-40. In its examination ofJapanese multinational corporations,
the court stressed the inherent control that Japanese parent corporations maintain
over their subsidiaries. Id. at 1339. For a critique of the Bulova court's use ofjudicial
notice, see Comment, supra note 188, at 105-08, 112 (discussed infra note 199).
196. See Bulova, 508 F. Supp. at 1329-33, 1340-41. One of the most important
factors the court examined was the role of Moriya, an officer of Hattori, and one of
the individual defendants that the plaintiff charged with, among other things, con-
spiracy to raid the plaintiff's marketing staff. See id. at 1329. During the period that
the complained-of events occurred, Moriya was president and director of SCA, sole
director of Pulsar Time and SPD Precision, director of Seiko Time, an officer of two
other of Seiko's United States subsidiaries, and a director of a third. Id. at 1329-30.
At the same time Moriya held the positions at Hattori of Deputy Manager, Manager
of the International Marketing Department and, significantly for the purpose of the
Bulova litigation, Manager of the Personnel Department. Id. at 1331.
Although the defendant asserted that, while in New York, Moriya was acting only
on behalf of Hattori's United States subsidiaries and not for Hattori itself, the court
was not persuaded by this argument. See id. The court found that the actions taken
by Moriya in New York were undertaken on behalf of Hattori, to expand the parent
corporation's presence in the United States. Id. at 1341. While the court did not
explicitly state that Moriya was acting as Hattori's agent while in New York, the impli-
cation is apparent. See id. at 1331. "Common sense ... dictates ... that while in the
United States Moriya loyally performed substantial services for Hattori." Id. Signifi-
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sidiary establishes and expands a parent's market position in
the United States, for as long as the activity is being conducted
in New York, and with respect to activities furthering the par-
ent's ends, the parent is doing business in New York.1 97 This
novel approach has yet to be adopted in other jurisdictions,1 98
cantly, the court stated that its finding that it had jurisdiction over Hattori under the
doing business doctrine, due to the activities of Hattori's subsidiaries, was buttressed
by the fact that the cause of action was integrally related to Hattori's doing business
within the state. Id. at 1344.
Although the court claimed that it was not piercing the corporate veil, id. at
1342, the court discussed some factors relevant to that doctrine. In addition to dis-
cussing the interchange of officers and directors between Hattori and its subsidiaries,
the court pointed out that the corporations had held themselves out as one entity in
advertisements. See id. at 1329-30 (interchange of officers and directors); id. at 1332,
1340 (holding themselves out as one corporation).
197. Id. at 1344-45. The court stated that its holding was particularly applicable
"as to activities directly related to primary steps taken to ensure a place for its subsid-
iaries, as where action is taken to raid an established competitor's personnel in pene-
trating the American market." Id. at 1345.
198. The Bulova court's decision to exercise jurisdiction over an alien parent
corporation in connection with its use of subsidiaries to establish and expand its mar-
ket position in the United States, has only been followed in one case. See Andrulonis
v. United States, 526 F. Supp. 183 (N.D.N.Y. 1981). Unlike Bulova, Andrulonis in-
volved the control by an individual, Werner Glatt, over a West German and a United
States corporation. Id. at 189-90. Mr. Glatt owned 100% of the stock of the West
German corporation, Glatt GmbH, and 85% of the stock of the United States distrib-
utor of the products of Glatt GmbH, Glatt Air Techniques, Inc. (GAT). Id. at 185-86.
Although GAT was not the subsidiary of Glatt GmbH, the court found that Glatt
GmbH controlled GAT through Werner Glatt. Id. at 190. The court held that it had
jurisdiction over Glatt GmbH. Id. at 190. In support of this exercise ofjurisdiction,
the court pointed to GAT's recent incorporation and dependence on Glatt GmbH.
Id. at 189 (citing Bulova, 508 F. Supp. at 1337-38). In addition, the court mentioned
the importance of the United States market to Glatt GmbH's continued growth, as
well as the significance of GAT's contribution to Glatt GmbH's earnings. Id. at 189-
90. The court held that, given these facts, it would be unfair for Glatt GmbH to
escape jurisdiction, especially in an action arising out of the activities of GAT that
furthered Glatt GmbH's ends. Id. at 190 (citing Bulova, 508 F. Supp. at 1344-45).
Since Bulova, a number of New York cases have reaffirmed the importance of the
traditional agency and the alter-ego concepts in determining jurisdiction over alien
corporations. See, e.g., Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Beech Aircraft Corp.,
751 F.2d 117 (2d Cir. 1984). In Volkswagenwerk, the Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit stated that officers of a corporation that owns the stock of another corpora-
tion necessarily exercise control over the subsidiary and its board of directors in their
capacity as representatives of the controlling stockholder. Id. at 120, 121. This fac-
tor alone is not enough to subject the parent to jurisdiction in New York. Id. Only
when the parent shows a disregard for the separate corporate existence of the subsid-
iary will New York courts be able to assert jurisdiction over the parent. Id. at 120.
The issues that the court viewed as relevant in deciding when to assert jurisdiction
were common ownership, financial dependence of the subsidiary on the parent, the
degree to which the parent interferes in the selection and assignment of executive
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and one commentator has criticized the decision as advancing
a policy that could have a negative impact on international
trade. 199
As these cases demonstrate, the case law in the United
States addressing jurisdiction over alien parent corporations
that have subsidiaries doing business in the United States has
been inconsistent. Some courts have followed the Cannon doc-
personnel of the subsidiary and fails to observe corporate formalities, and the degree
of control the parent exercises over the marketing and operational policies of the
subsidiary. Id. at 120-22. In Volkswagenwerk, the court held that it did have jurisdic-
tion over the defendant, a Delaware corporation that had a subsidiary doing business
in New York. Id. at 122. One element that the court found important was that the
parent had given a no-interest loan to the subsidiary with no stated payment date,
along with other extensions of credit. In addition, the parent paid the entire salaries
of the officers it shared with the subsidiary, and the subsidiary conducted no formal
meetings of its board of directors except for quarterly marketing meetings. Id. at
121-22. These factors, taken together, were sufficient to give New York courts juris-
diction over the parent corporation. Id. at 122.
In another recent case, Mayer v. Josiah Wedgwood & Sons, Ltd., 601 F. Supp.
1523 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), the District Court for the Southern District of New York stated
that a subsidiary will be considered a "mere department" of its parent for purposes
of § 301 of the N.Y. CIv. PRAC. LAW (McKinney 1972) (doing business doctrine), only
if the foreign parent's control of the subsidiary is pervasive enough that the corpo-
rate separateness is more formal than real. Mayer, 601 F. Supp. at 1529 n.5. In
Mayer, the court determined that the United Kingdom parent corporation did not
exercise pervasive control over its United States subsidiary, a New York corporation,
and therefore the court could not exercise jurisdiction on that basis. Id. Alterna-
tively, the court examined the possibility of exercising jurisdiction over the parent
based on the concept of agency. Id. Under the agency theory, a parent would be
subject to suit in New York under the doing business doctrine if the subsidiary was
doing business in New York on the parent's behalf. Id. The court stated that corpo-
rate affiliation may, in light of the facts of a case, give rise to a valid inference of
agency. Id. In this instance, however, the court found that the subsidiary's advertis-
ing, promotion and servicing were done on its own behalf to further its own corpo-
rate purpose. Id. In addition, thue subsidiary had no power to bind the parent in any
way. Id. Therefore, the court concluded that the common ownership of the parent
and the subsidiary did not give rise to a valid inference of agency. Id.
199. See Comment, supra note 188, at 112. That Comment especially criticized
the Bulova court's extensive use ofjudicial notice to support its finding that Hattori
controlled its United States subsidiaries. Id. The Comment stated that an inquiry
into the development of a corporation entering the United States market may be
helpful in setting guidelines for determining the implications of control by a parent
corporation over its subsidiary. Id. Nevertheless, an analysis of a particular country's
economic hierarchy may place an alien corporation that is attempting to utilize the
United States market at the disadvantage of being categorized on the basis of its own
nation's customs. Id. The Comment concluded that the likely result of this type of
approach is to discourage alien corporations from entering the United States market.
Id.
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trine,200 while others have not.20 1 Still, other courts have not
discussed Cannon at all, and instead, they have based their ex-
ercise ofjurisdiction over parent corporations on the stream of
commerce or purposeful availment theories.20 2 The inconsis-
tency in the case law makes it difficult for potential defendants
to structure their conduct with certainty, because they cannot
predict which of their actions may render them liable to suit. 20 3
This result is troubling, especially because the United States
Supreme Court has determined that one of the purposes of the
due process clause is to enhance the predictability of the
United States legal system.2 4 There is no justifiable reason
why, under similar facts, Toshiba Corporation should be sub-
ject to thejurisdiction of Maryland courts but not those of New
Mexico.20 5
II. LA W OF THE UNITED KINGDOM AND THE UNITED
STATES- UNITED KINGDOM CONVENTION
Unlike United States law on jurisdiction over alien corpo-
rations, the law of the United Kingdom in this area has been
relatively uniform. 20 6 A company2° 7 that is incorporated in the
United Kingdom is subject to the jurisdiction of that nation's
courts. 0 8 Companies incorporated outside of the United
200. See, e.g., Samuels v. B.M.W. of N. Am., 554 F. Supp. 1191 (E.D. Tex. 1983)
(discussed supra notes 140-53 and accompanying text).
201. See, e.g., Brunswick, 575 F. Supp. at 1418-21 (discussed supra notes 165-73
and accompanying text).
202. See, e.g., Kawasaki, 604 F. Supp. at 970-71 (stream of commerce and pur-
poseful availment) (discussed supra notes 113-25 and accompanying text); Copiers,
576 F. Supp. at 319-20 (stream of commerce and purposeful availment) (discussed
supra notes175-78, 181-86 and accompanying text).
203. See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, - U.S. at -, 105 S. Ct. at 2182.
204. See id. (citing World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. at 297).
205. Compare Allen v. Toshiba Corp., 599 F. Supp. 381 (D. N.M. 1984) with
Copiers Typewriters Calculators, Inc. v. Toshiba Corp., 576 F. Supp. 312 (D. Md.
1983). For a discussion of Allen and Copiers, see supra notes 174-86 and accompanying
text.
206. See Fawcett,Jurisdiction and Subsidiaries, 1985J. Bus. L. 16; Schmitthoff, The
Wholly Owned and the Controlled Subsidiary, 1978 J. Bus. L. 218, 219-24 [hereinafter
cited as Schmitthoff, 1978]; Schmitthoff, Multinationals in Court, 1972J. Bus. L. 103,
105-09 [hereinafter cited as Schmitthoff, 1972]; 1 A. DIcEY &J. MORRIS, CONFLICT OF
LAws 186-89 (10th ed. 1980). But see infra notes 220-21 and accompanying text on
the lack of United Kingdom case law in this area.
207. In the United Kingdom the term "company" is used to include corpora-
tions. See, e.g., Companies Act 1985 (Halsbury 1985).
208. See Companies Act 1985, § 725(1) (Halsbury 1985). Service of a document
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Kingdom that establish a "place of business '12 9 there are re-
quired to register with the registrar of companies 2 0 and are
subject to service of process. 2 1' A company will be considered
to have a place of business in the United Kingdom if the place
of business is fixed and definite,21 2 and it is established there
for a sufficient period of time.2 3 An alien company that has a
place of business in the United Kingdom, but does not comply
with the registration requirements of company law there,21 4
may be served at its place of business in the United King-
dom.2 15
One commentator in the United Kingdom 21 6 has con-
cluded that the requirement that an alien company have a
place of business in the United Kingdom to be subject tojuris-
diction there signifies that an alien parent with a branch office
in the United Kingdom would be subject to jurisdiction,
on a company incorporated in the United Kingdom can be made by leaving it at, or
sending it to, the registered office of the company in the United Kingdom. Id. The
general rules ofjurisdiction do not necessarily apply to cases falling within the scope
of the European Communities Convention on Jurisdiction and Enforcement ofJudg-
ments in Civil and Commercial Matters, 15J.O. COMM. EUR. (No. L 299) 32 (1972); 3
COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 6003 (entered into force on Feb. 1, 1973) [hereinafter
cited as the Brussels Convention]. Cf. Fawcett, supra note 206, at 16 n.2 (stating that
his article on jurisdiction and subsidiaries will not address those cases falling within
the scope of the Brussels Convention). For a discussion of the Brussels Convention
see infra notes 244-49 and accompanying text.
209. The term "place of business" includes a share transfer or share registration
office. Companies Act 1985, § 744 (Halsbury 1985).
210. Id. § 691.
211. Id. § 695(1); see 1 A. DICEY &J. MORRIS, supra note 206, at 186-89 (com-
menting on alien companies under the 1948 Companies Act). The sections of the
1948 Companies Act addressing alien companies have remained essentially un-
changed under the 1985 Companies Act. Compare Companies Act 1948 §§ 406-423
(Halsbury 1968) with Companies Act 1985 §§ 691-703 (Halsbury 1985). A company
incorporated outside of the United Kingdom that establishes a place of business in
the United Kingdom will sometimes be referred to as an "oversea company" by the
Companies Act 1985. See, e.g., Companies Act 1985, §§ 695, 700, 701 (Halsbury
1985); id. § 744 (definition of overseas company).
212. Okura & Co. v. ForsbackaJernverks A/B [1914] 1 K.B. 715, 718 (C.A.);
Saccharin Corp. v. Chemische Fabrik A/G, [1911] 2 K.B. 516, 522 (C.A.); see The
"Theodohos," [1977] 2 Lloyd's L.R. 428.
213. Okura, [1914] 1 K.B. at 718; Thames & Mersey Marine Ins. Co. v. Societa di
Navigazione a Vapore del Lloyd Austriaco, [1914] All E.R. 1104, 1106 (ten years is a
"substantial time").
214. See Companies Act 1985, §§ 691-693, 696 (registration by oversea compa-
nies); id. §§ 700-703 (delivery of accounts) (Halsbury 1985).
215. Id. § 695(2)(a); see 1 A. DICEY &J. MORRIS, supra note 206, at 188.
216. See Schmitthoff, 1978, supra note 206; Schmitthoff, 1972, supra note 206.
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whereas one with a wholly-owned subsidiary would not.
2 17
This conclusion is based in part on the law of the United King-
dom, which favors the theory that parent corporations and
their subsidiaries, even if wholly-owned, are separate enti-
ties.21 8
In the United Kingdom, the theory of corporate separate-
ness was first enunciated in Salomon v. Salomon & Co.2 19 In this
217. Schmitthoff, 1978, supra note 206, at 223. Professor Fawcett has concluded
that whether a parent corporation does business through a branch office, independ-
ent commercial agent, or subsidiary, the jurisdictional test is always whether the
United Kingdom outlet is acting on behalf of the alien company. Fawcett, supra note
206, at 17. It is difficult to evaluate either Professor Schmitthoff's or Professor
Fawcett's view as to the jurisdictional tests for alien corporations that have United
Kingdom subsidiaries, since there have been so few cases in this area. See Fawcett,
supra note 206, at 16; Schmitthoff, 1972, supra note 206, at 105-09.
One case addressing jurisdiction over an alien parent corporation was Distillers
Co. v. Thompson, [1971] A.C. 458. Distillers involved an United Kingdom parent
company that had a subsidiary doing business in Australia. The court, in Distillers,
found jurisdiction over the United Kingdom parent, but this conclusion was not
based on the activities of the subsidiary. Instead, the court found that it had jurisdic-
tion over the parent corporation because the parent had committed an act of negli-
gence in failing to put a warning label on a drug it had manufactured. Id. at 469.
The warning could have been placed on the drug in England, or the parent company
could have communicated to persons in Australia to place the warning on when it
arrived there. Id. The court concluded that the negligent omission took place in part
in Australia, and therefore the court had jurisdiction over the parent corporation. Id.
Another case which involved an alien parent with a subsidiary doing business in
the United Kingdom was Deverall v. Grant Advertising Inc., [1955] Ch. 11. In this
case the plaintiff did not argue that the United States parent was present in the
United Kingdom through its subsidiary, but rather that the parent itself had estab-
lished a place of business in the United Kingdom along with its subsidiary. Id. at 111-
12. The court held that it did not have jurisdiction over the parent because the
parent had not established a place of business in the United Kingdom, and, even
assuming that it had done so at one time, such place no longer existed. Id. at 115-16,
120.
In Firestone Tyre and Rubber Co. v. Lewellin, [1957] 1 W.L.R. 464, a United
Kingdom court addressed the issue of whether an alien corporation was present in
the United Kingdom through its subsidiary. In that case the court found jurisdiction
over a United States parent company whose United Kingdom subsidiary manufac-
tured and sold the parent's tires. Id. at 472. The court determined that the subsidi-
ary was a separate legal entity, which sold its own goods, but found that for the pur-
poses of taxation the subsidiary was acting as an agent of its parent. Id. at 469. The
court's finding of agency was based in part on the parent's right to approve the sub-
sidiary's customers, set the price of the goods, and retain the profit from the subsidi-
ary's sales, less a fixed percentage. Id. For a discussion of Firestone, see Fawcett, supra
note 206, at 24.
218. See Ebbw Vale Urban District Council v. South Wales Traffic Area Licens-
ing Auth., [1951] 2 K.B. 366, 370 (citing Salomon v. Salomon & Co., [1897] A.C. 22);
Schmitthoff, 1978, supra note 206, at 219-20.
219. [1897] A.C. 22.
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case, the House of Lords rejected the view that the one incor-
porator of a wholly-owned company was the principal and the
company was his agent. 220 Instead, the court chose to regard
the two as separate legal entities. 22 t The court would disre-
gard the theory of legal separation between a corporation and
its incorporators only when fraud or agency could be estab-
lished, or when the corporation was a "fiction" or "myth. '22 2
Since Salomon, cases in the United Kingdom have disre-
garded the corporate form only when the incorporator,
whether an individual or corporation, has employed the com-
pany as an agent,223 or has abused the corporate form.224 The
220. Id. at 31.
221. Id. Short of proof of fraud, "it seems ... impossible to dispute that once
the company is legally incorporated it must be treated like any other independent
person with its rights and liabilities appropriate to itself." Id. at 30 (Halsbury, J.).
222. See id. at 33.
223. See, e.g., Re F.G. (Films) Ltd., [1953] All E.R. 615, 616 (United Kingdom
company was held to be an agent for an United States company which appeared to
have financed the film in question); Smithe, Stone & Knight v. Birmingham Corp.,
[ 1939] 4 All E.R. 116, 121 (when the parent controlled the business of the subsidiary,
and profits of the subsidiary were treated as profits of the parent, the court found the
subsidiary to be carrying on business for the parent); Commissioners of Inland Reve-
nue v. Sansom, [1921] 2 K.B. 492, 503 (although a company may be a legal entity
under Salomon, it may act as an agent for its shareholders, thereby making the share-
holders liable for the taxes of the business of the company); The Gramophone &
Typewriter, Ltd. v. Stanley, [1908] 2 K.B. 89, 96 (a person may cause such an ar-
rangement to be entered between himself and a company as will suffice to make the
company his agent for the purpose of carrying on business); see also Camilla Cotton
Oil Co. v. Grandex S.A. and Tracomin S.A., [1976] 2 Lloyd's L.R. 10, 15-16 (compar-
ison of United Kingdom, Swiss and United States law on the doctrine of agency).
Many courts have found that the ability of a United Kingdom company to bind
an alien company is the crucial inquiry in determining whether an agency relation-
ship exits between them. In Thames, [1914] All E.R. at 1106, the court stated that the
question to ask in each case is:
Does the agent, in carrying on the foreign corporation's business, make a
contract for the foreign corporation, or does the agent, in carrying on his
own business, sell a contract with the foreign corporation? In the former
case the foreign corporation is and in the latter it is not carrying on business
at that place.
Id. (emphasis added); see The Lalandia, [1933] All E.R. 391, 396; Okura, [1914] 2 K.B.
at 721; see also Saccharin, [1911] 2 K.B. at 522, 524, 526 (ability of agent to bind the
defendant corporation was one factor the court considered in holding that the agent
could be served as an officer of the defendant); Fawcett, supra note 206, at 23 (the
most important jurisdictional criterion is the ability of the "outlet" of the alien com-
pany to bind the alien company contractually). But see The World Harmony, [1965] 2
W.L.R. 1275. In World Harmony, the court found that it had jurisdiction over a
Liberian company due to the activities of its agent in the United Kingdom, even
though the agent could not bind the alien company contractually. Id. at 1280. The
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establishment of a wholly-owned company does not, by itself,
constitute an abuse of the corporate form.225 To argue that
the corporate form has been abused, the plaintiff must show
something additional, such as demonstrating that the con-
trolled company was a device or a sham.226 The doctrine of
doing business, which is accepted in the United States as a ba-
sis for the exercise of jurisdiction, 227 has not been recognized
in the United Kingdom.228  Therefore, courts in the United
Kingdom are limited to finding jurisdiction over an alien cor-
poration based on the activities of its subsidiary only when
there is an agency relationship or an abuse of the corporate
form between the parent and the subsidiary. 29
court based its holding on the fact that the agent actively managed the ship in ques-
tion for the alien company. Id. at 1279-80, 1284.
224. See, e.g., Selangor United Rubber Estates Ltd. v. Cradock, [1968] 1 W.L.R.
1555 (when directors of a company used company money for their own purposes,
they would be held personally liable for their illegal transactions); Jones v. Lipman,
[1962] 1 W.L.R. 832, 836 (when a United Kingdom company had only nominal capi-
tal, was controlled by its principal shareholder, and was created for the purpose of
defeating the plaintiff's right to specific performance, the company was declared a
sham); Re F.G. (Films) Ltd., [1953] All E.R. at 616 (the court held that a United King-
dom company with almost no capital, no staff, and no premises except its registered
office, could not be regarded as the maker of the film in question); Gilford Motor Co.
v. Home, [1933] Ch. 935, 961, 965 (defendant was using his company in breach of a
covenant not to compete with his old employer, and the court held that the company
was a cloak or sham); see also Malyon v. Plummer, [1964] 1 Q.B. 330, 342 (court
disregarded the existence of the corporate entity when assessing damages of a wife
for the loss of her husband who ran the company and made it profitable).
225. Schmitthoff, 1978, supra note 206, at 220; see Salomon, [1897] A.C. 22. In
Salomon, there were seven shareholders but they were all members of one family. Id.
at 31. TheJudge of the first instance, Vaughan Williams,J., appeared to have treated
the company as being under the control of Mr. Salomon. See id. at 35-36.
226. Jones v. Lipman, [1962] 1 W.L.R. at 836. Abuse of the corporate form is
comparable to the United States alter-ego theory because if a United Kingdom court
finds that there has been abuse, it will treat the company and its incorporators as one.
See id. at 836-37.
227. See, e.g., Graco, Inc. v. Kremlin, Inc., 558 F. Supp. at 192-193; Bulova
Watch Co. v. K. Hattori & Co., 508 F. Supp. at 1333-35, 1344-47.
228. See Mathers, The UK/US Civil Judgments Convention-H, 127 NEw L.J. 819
(1977).
229. Schmitthoff, 1978, supra note 206, at 219-20; see also Fawcett, supra note
206, at 16-17 (stressing agency relationship between parent and subsidiary as the
controlling criterion for jurisdiction under existing law). Some critics in the United
Kingdom have taken the view that alien corporations doing business in the United
Kingdom through subsidiaries should be treated the same as those doing business in
the United Kingdom through a branch office for jurisdictional purposes. See Schmitt-
hoff, 1978, supra note 206, at 223-24; Schmitthoff, Salomon in the Shadow, 1976J. Bus.
L. 305, 312; Schmitthoff, 1972, supra note 206, at 109-11; Fawcett, supra note 206, at
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On October 26, 1976, the United States and the United
25 (stating that, at present, United Kingdom courts will take jurisdiction only when a
subsidiary operates as a branch office and can bind the parent contractually). Fawcett
has suggested that courts of the United Kingdom should adopt a wider notion of
agency to extend jurisdiction over alien multinationals with subsidiaries in the United
Kingdom. Id. at 23-25. Schmitthoff has suggested that all alien multinationals which
carry on substantial business in the United Kingdom should have a registered office
there, and that the United Kingdom court in the district where the multinational en-
terprise has its registered office, should be given jurisdiction over all entities that are
a part of the multinational enterprise irrespective of whether they carry on business
in the United Kingdom. Schmitthoff, 1972, supra note 206, at 110.
Schmitthoff has also suggested that the United Kingdom adopt the view es-
poused by the European Court ofJustice in Imperial Chem. Indus., Ltd. v. Commis-
sion of the European Communities, 1972 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 619, [1971-1973
Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8161 (sometimes referred to as the
"Dyestuffs Case"). See Schmitthoff, 1978, supra note 206, at 223-24. In Imperial Chem-
ical, the Court of Justice held that article 85(1) of the Treaty establishing the Euro-
pean Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1 (Cmd. 5179.11)
(official English translation), 298 U.N.T.S. 3 (1958) (unofficial English translation)
[hereinafter cited as EEC Treaty], could be enforced against a company incorporated
in a non-Member nation. Imperial Chemical, 1972 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 661-63,
[1971-1973 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8161, at 8030-8031. Arti-
cle 85 of the EEC Treaty addresses agreements that have an anticompetitive effect.
EEC Treaty, supra, art. 85.
The original member states of the European Economic Community (EEC) were
France, Italy, The Federal Republic of Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Lux-
embourg. EEC Treaty, supra, preamble. The United Kingdom, Ireland, and Den-
mark joined the EEC on January 1, 1973. Treaty of Accession, Jan. 22, 1972, 1973
Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1 (Cmd. 5179-1). Greece became the tenth member state in 1979.
Treaty of Accession of the Hellenic Republic, May 28, 1979, 22 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No.
L 291) 9 (1979). Spain and Portugal became Member states of the EEC onJanuary 1,
1986. Treaty of Accession of the Kingdom of Spain and the Portuguese Republic, 28
O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 302) 9 (1985).
The Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community, March 25,
1957, 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1 (Cmd. 5179-I), 298 U.N.T.S. 169 [hereinafter cited
as Euratom], was signed on the same date as the EEC Treaty. The two treaties came
into force on January 1, 1958 and provided for a Court of Justice for the EEC. EEC
Treaty, supra, art. 4(1); Euratom, supra, art. (3). The Treaty establishing the Euro-
pean Coal and Steel Community, Apr. 18, 1951, 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 2 (Cmd.
5189), 261 U.N.T.S. 142, was signed on April 18, 1951 and came into force on July
23, 1952, 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 2 at 91; 261 U.N.T.S. at 142 n.1.
The Court of Justice administers three bodies of Community law, those of the
European Coal and Steel Community, the European Atomic Energy Community, and
the EEC. Convention on Certain Institutions Common to the European Communi-
ties, Mar. 25, 1957, § II, 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1 (Cmd. 5179-II). The jurisdiction
of the Court is defined in articles 169-83 of the EEC Treaty. EEC Treaty, supra, art.
169-83.
The issue in Imperial Chemical was whether increases in the price of dyestuffs that
occurred in Italy, The Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, Germany, and France in
1964, 1965 and 1967 had been made by mutual agreement between certain Euro-
pean manufacturers of dyestuffs, in violation of article 85 of the EEC Treaty. Imperial
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Kingdom initialed a Convention on the Reciprocal Recogni-
Chemical, 1972 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 622, [1971-1973 Transfer Binder] COMMON
MKT. REP. (CCH) 8161, at 8003. The Commission of European Communities (the
Commission) had found that these increases stemmed from concerted practices of
the defendant that were in violation of article 85 of the EEC Treaty. See 12 J.O.
COMM. EUR. (No. L 195) 11 (1969). The Court ofJustice affirmed the Commission's
decision, denying the defendant's application for the annulment of that decision. Im-
perial Chemical, 1972 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 648-64, [1971-1973 Transfer Binder]
COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8161, at 8024-8032.
In Imperial Chemical the Court of Justice addressed the issue of the Commis-
sion's jurisdiction over the defendant, a company incorporated in the United King-
dom, which at that time, had not yet joined the EEC. While the Commission argued
that its jurisdiction extends to conduct outside the EEC if the conduct produces ef-
fects within the Community, the Court did not base it holding ofjurisdiction on this
theory. Instead, the Court held that by and through its relationship with its subsidi-
ary in the Common Market, the defendant had itself acted in the Common Market,
stating:
The fact that a subsidiary has a separate legal personality is not sufficient to
exclude the possibility of imputing its conduct to the parent company. Such
may be the case in particular where the subsidiary, although having separate
legal personality, does not decide independently upon its own conduct on
the market, but carries out, in all material respects, the instructions given to
it by the parent company.
Id. at 662, [1971-1973 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8161, at 8031.
The Court then found that the defendant was able to, and did, influence the sale
price policy of its subsidiary in the Common Market. Id. The Court concluded:
the formal separation between these companies, resulting from their sepa-
rate legal personality, cannot outweigh the unity of their conduct on the
market for the purposes of applying the rules on competition. It was in fact
the [defendant] which brought the concerted practice into being within the
Common Market. The submission as to lack of jurisdiction raised by the
[defendant] must therefore be declared to be unfounded.
Id. at 663, [1971-1973 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8161, at 8031.
The Court's position, in Imperial Chemical, on the Commission's jurisdiction over
the defendant, has been criticized, most significantly by the Advocate General in Im-
perial Chemical. The Advocate General was not convinced that the Commission had
sufficiently demonstrated that the defendant controlled its subsidiary to such an ex-
tent that the subsidiary's separate legal personality should be denied. See id. at 693,
[1971-1973 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8161, at 8055. The Advo-
cate General was therefore unwilling to adopt the Commission's position that the
parent company acted within the Common Market through its control of its subsidi-
ary. See id.
For other critiques of the Court's decision in Imperial Chemical, see Mann, The
Dyestuffs Case in the Court ofJustice of the European Communities, 22 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 35,
46-50 (1973); Note, Common Market-Antitrust-Interpretation of Concerted Practices
Within the Meaning of Article 85-Extraterritorial Jurisdiction of the European Commission, 14
HARV. INT'L LJ. 621, 628 (1973). "Since the enterprise theory is premised upon a
finding of complete economic control of the subsidiary by the parent, the long-term
relationship of [the parent] and its subsidiary should have been indicated more
fully." Id.
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tion and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil Matters. 23 0 Arti-
cles 10 and 11 of the convention list the bases for jurisdiction
which would entitle a judgment to reciprocal recognition, as
long as the judgment has binding effect within the "territory of
origin. ' 231 A few sections of article 10 are pertinent to alien
corporations that do business 232 within the territory of origin.
230. U.S.-U.K. Convention, supra note 23. This convention does not address
the grounds on which the courts of either nation may exercise jurisdiction. The con-
vention only addresses the circumstances under which these judgments will be recog-
nized and enforced in the other nation. Id. art. 2(1).
The Draft Convention has not been ratified, and negotiations on it have been
suspended for the time being. See Von Mehren, Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Judgments: Contemporary Practices and the Role of Conventions, in 1980 PRIVATE INVESTORS
ABROAD: PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS 223, 277-78 n.78. The 1976 draft was met with
hostility in the United Kingdom, most especially from United Kingdom insurance
interests. Id. It appeared that these organizations were most concerned about juris-
diction under United States long arm statutes, and the size of United States jury ver-
dicts. Id. In an effort to rectify some of the disagreements on the draft, further
negotiations were undertaken in September 1978. Id. These negotiations lead to an
unsigned text of September 1978. Id. On May 14, 1980, the British Embassy in
Washington delivered a note to the Department of State, advising the United States
that the reactions to the draft text from major representative organizations continued
to be hostile. Id. Therefore, the United Kingdom authorities concluded that there
was no prospect of reaching an agreement on a convention in this area at the present
time. Id. There have been no further negotiations on the U.S.-U.K. Convention
since 1978. Telephone interview with P. Fund of the International Law Office of the
State Department, March 3, 1986.
231. U.S.-U.K. Convention, supra note 23, art. 4(l)(a), (b). Territory of origin is
defined as the nation, either the United States or the United Kingdom, for which the
court of origin was exercising jurisdiction. Id. art. (1)(i), (j). the "court of origin" is
defined as the court which gave a judgment for which recognition or enforcement is
sought under the convention. Id. art. 1(d).
232. Article 10(j) of the U.S.-U.K. Convention has a provision for jurisdiction
based on the commission of a tort, resulting in injury to person or property that
could extend to alien corporations. Id. art. 10j). Under this section, however, both
the act or omission that caused the injury or damage and the actual injury or damage
has to have occurred in the nation in which the court of origin exercised jurisdiction.
Id. So where a United Kingdom corporation committed a negligent act in the United
Kingdom, and then shipped products to the United State which caused injury to
someone there, jurisdiction of the United States courts would not lie under § 10(j).
See Mathers, supra note 228, at 820. Because it would seem that a company would be
most likely to commit a tortious act or omission in the nation in which it has its
principle place of business, this provision would not be very useful as a vehicle to
reach alien corporations through their subsidiaries or otherwise. Compare U.S.-U.K.
Convention, supra note 23, with Brussels Convention, supra note 208, art. 5(3). The
Brussels Convention states that a defendant domiciled in the territory of a Con-
tracting State may be sued in another Contracting State in cases of torts or quasi
torts, before the court of the place where the injury occurred. Brussels Convention,
supra note 208, art. 5(3). This section has been interpreted by the European Court of
Justice as giving a plaintiff the option of proceeding in the court of the place where
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Under that article, a court will have jurisdiction when a corpo-
rate defendant has its principal place of business, or was incor-
porated in the forum state.233 Jurisdiction will also be valid if a
defendant has a branch or "other establishment" within the
territory of origin,2 34 or when it conducts business on a contin-
uing basis.235 In these latter two situations, however, article 10
specifically excepts subsidiary corporations, so that a judgment
will not be recognized when jurisdiction is based on the pres-
ence, or business activities, of a subsidiary of the defendant in
the forum.23 6
The provisions of article 10 depart, to a certain extent,
from United States law. 23 7 Article 10 eliminates the possibility
of treating an independent subsidiary as having acted on be-
half of a corporate defendant. 23 8 However the alter-ego doc-
trine should be viable, because piercing the corporate veil is
similar to a finding that the subsidiary is a mere division or
branch of the defendant. 23 9
Ratification by the United States Senate of conventions on
the enforcement of judgments, such as the United States-
United Kingdom Convention, would provide a number of ben-
efits to the United States. First, ratification might result in a
the act or the injury occurred. Handelswerkerij G.J. Bier B.V. v. Mines de Potasse
d'Alsace S.A., 1976 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1735, [1976 Transfer Binder] COMMON
MKT. REP. (CCH) 8378; see Mathers, supra note 228, at 820.
233. The U.S.-U.K. Convention, supra note 23, art. 10(b). In the case of an unin-
corporated association, the court of the state where the association has its headquar-
ters will have jurisdiction. Id.
234. Id. art. 10(c).
235. Id. art. 10(e).
236. Id. art. 10(c), (e).
237. See Smit, The Proposed United States-United Kingdom Convention on Recognition
and Enforcement ofJudgments: A Prototype for the Future?, 17 VA.J. INT'L L. 443, 461; see,
e.g., Brunswick Corp. v. Suzuki Motor Co., 575 F. Supp. at 1421 (interpretation of the
doing business provision of the Wisconsin long arm statute by the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin). In Brunswick, the court interpreted
the provision to include the activities of subsidiaries as a basis for jurisdiction over
parent corporations. Id.; see supra notes 165-73 and accompanying text.
238. U.S.-U.K. Convention, supra note 23, art. 10(c), (e).
239. See, e.g., Coca-Cola Co. v. Procter & Gamble Co., 595 F. Supp. 304, 308
(N.D. Ga. 1978) (division or department); Taca Int'l Airlines, S.A. v. Rolls-Royce of
Eng., Ltd., 15 N.Y.2d 97, 102, 204 N.E.2d 329, 331, 256 N.Y.S.2d 129, 132 (1965)
(mere department); see also P. BLUMBERG, supra note 10, at 85 (discussion of New York
courts' use of the "mere department" theory). The presence of a branch office of the
defendant is a valid basis for jurisdiction under the U.S.-U.K. Convention. U.S.-U.K.
Convention, supra note 23, art. 10(c).
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more uniform recognition of foreign nation judgments in
United States courts.2 4 In addition, ratification of such con-
ventions may lead to increased recognition of United States
judgments abroad.24' Most importantly,242 ratification of con-
ventions on the enforcement of judgments, especially with
members of the European Economic Community (EEC),243
would help to eliminate a problem that has arisen in connec-
tion with the EEC Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforce-
ment of Judgments (the Brussels Convention).244 The Brus-
sels Convention discriminates 245 against United States domicil-
iaries 246  in its validation of the exercise of so-called
"exorbitant 247jurisdiction over defendants not domiciled in a
contracting state.248
240. Smit, supra note 237, at 443; see Comment, The Effect of the Proposed U.S.-U.K.
Reciprocal Recognition and Enforcement of CivilJudgments Treaty on Current Recognition Prac-
tices in the United States, 18 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L., 119, 120 (1979).
241. Smit, supra note 237, at 444. Professor Smit points out that as between the
United States and the United Kingdom this would not be an advantage to the passage
of a recognition treaty since both countries have liberal recognition rules. Id. at 444
n.9 and accompanying text.
242. Id. at 445.
243. For a definition and discussion of the EEC, see supra note 229.
244. See supra note 208.
245. See Smit, supra note 237, at 445; Nadelmann,Jurisdictionally Improper Fora in
Treaties on Recognition of Judgments: The Common Market Draft, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 995,
998-1001 (1967).
246. For purposes of the Brussels Convention the domicile of a corporation is
where the seat of the company is located. Brussels Convention, supra note 208, art.
53.
247. See, e.g., Smit, supra note 237, at 445. Some examples of exorbitant jurisdic-
tion would be the civil codes of France and Luxembourg, which allow for a proceed-
ing to be brought in the courts of each respective nation as long as the plaintiff is a
citizen of that nation. Code de procedure civile [C. PR. CIV.] art. 14 (Dalloz 1985-
86) (France); Code Civil [C. Civ.] art. 14 (Luxembourg). Another example is the
Federal Republic of Germany, where jurisdiction vests on the basis of the presence of
assets. Zivilprozessordnung [ZPO] art. 23 (code of civil procedure). German courts
have interpreted this provision to render judgments in excess of the value of the
assets present. See Bartlett, Full Faith and Credit Comes to the Common Market: Analysis of
the Provisions of the Convention on Jurisdiction and Enforcement ofJudgments in Civil and Com-
mercial Matters, 24 INT'L & CoMP. L.Q. 44, 53 (1975). For a discussion of these, and
other forms of exorbitant jurisdiction in the context of the Brussels Convention, see
Bartlett, supra, at 53; Nadelmann, supra note 245, at 998-99 (using the term "im-
proper fora" rather than "exorbitant jurisdiction").
248. Brussels Convention, supra note 208, art. 4. Article 4 states that if a de-
fendant is not domiciled in the territory of a Contracting State, the jurisdiction of the
courts in each Contracting State shall be governed by the laws of that State, which
may include exorbitant bases for jurisdiction. Id. art. 4. In addition, Contracting
States must recognize judgments based on exorbitant jurisdiction rendered by other
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The Brussels Convention does allow for a member state to
enter into agreements with third countries to alter the rule per-
mitting the recognition of exorbitant jurisdiction.2 49 Article 18
of the United States-United Kingdom Convention allows both
countries to refuse recognition ofjudgments based on exorbi-
tant jurisdiction.250 If the United States entered into treaties
for the recognition of judgments with members of the EEC,
refusal to recognize judgments based on exorbitant jurisdic-
tion could also be incorporated into those agreements.2 5 '
Finally, even though conventions on the recognition of
judgments may not address the actual exercise of jurisdic-
252 stntion, the standards they provide for recognition will have a
positive influence on United States courts.253 These standards
would, in the case of the United States-United Kingdom Con-
vention, exclude the exercise of jurisdiction over alien corpo-
rations based on the activities of their subsidiaries.2 5"
Member States against non-domiciliaries. Smit, supra note 237, at 445; see Brussels
Convention, supra note 208, art. 4, 26, 31. By way of comparison, domiciliaries of
Contracting States are to be sued in the courts of the State in which they are domi-
ciled. Id. art. 2. The Convention specifies that article 14 of the civil codes of France
and Luxembourg, as well as article 23 of the Code of Civil Procedure for the Federal
Republic of Germany, and provisions from the codes of other nations that permit
judgments based on exorbitant jurisdiction, may not be invoked against a domiciliary
of a Contracting State. Id. art. 3. Since the United States is not a signatory to the
Brussels Convention, the exercise of exorbitant jurisdiction would be permitted over
defendants domiciled there. See id. art. 4.
249. Id. art. 59.
250. See U.S.-U.K. Convention, supra note 23, art. 18.
251. See Brussels Convention, supra note 208, art. 59.
252. The U.S.-U.K. Convention does not address the actual exercise ofjurisdic-
tion. See U.S.-U.K. Convention, supra note 23, art. 2(1). However, the Brussels Con-
vention addresses both jurisdiction and the enforcement ofjudgments. See Brussels
Convention, supra note 208, arts. 2-24.
253. Mathers, supra note 228, at 821.
254. See U.S.-U.K. Convention, supra note 23, art. 10(c), (e). If the grounds the
Convention sets forth or recognition of judgments were followed by United States
courts as guidelines for the exercise of jurisdiction, this would alleviate Professor
Smit's fear that the passage of the U.S.-U.K. Convention would result in increased
uncertainty in United States law in that the courts would have to construe two sets of
rules on adjudicatory authority, rather than one. See Smit, supra note 237, at 461-62.
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IV. JURISDICTION SHOULD NOT BE EXTENDED TO
FOREIGN CORPORATIONS BASED ON THE
ACTIVITIES OF THEIR SUBSIDIARIES
A. Rationale
There are numerous reasons why certain forms ofjurisdic-
tion, such as those based on foreign acts that have effects
within the forum, as well as jurisdiction based on the doctrine
of doing business, must be judiciously applied, particularly in
an international context.2 55 Because the separate states of the
United States are not independently sovereign, allowing them
to exercise broad jurisdiction over citizens of other states of
the Union is not generally objectionable.25 6 There is a much
greater chance that the laws of two sovereign nations will con-
flict than the laws of two states.257 When the laws of individual
states do conflict, the United States Supreme Court has the au-
thority to resolve internal conflict, 258 whereas there is no final
arbitrator in disputes between nations. In addition, the bur-
den on an alien defendant to litigate in the United States is
potentially greater than that of a domestic corporation to de-
fend itself in a foreign state.259
The jurisdictional tests that are acceptable to United
States courts may be viewed as exorbitant in an international
context.260 The comity of nations 26' and the United States' de-
255. Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326, 1341 (2d
Cir. 1972).
256. Note, The Outer Limits of In Personam Jurisdiction Over Alien Corporations: The
National Contacts Theory, 16 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 637, 656 (1982).
257. Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Marina Salina Cruz, 649 F.2d 1266, 1272 (9th
Cir. 1981).
258. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1; see Note, supra note 256, at 656.
259. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
260. Hay & Walker, The Proposed U.S.-U.K. Recognition offJudgments Convention: An-
other Perspective, 18 VA.J. INT'L L. 753, 759 (1978); see also Note, supra note 256, at 656
(international jurisdictional standards arguably must be stricter than domestic ones).
261. The comity of nations dictates "[t]he extent to which the law of one nation,
as put in force within its territory ... shall be allowed to operate within the dominion
of another nation .... " Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163 (1895). It is neither a
matter of absolute obligation nor one of mere courtesy and good will. Id. at 163. It
is the recognition that one nation allows within its territory to the legislative, execu-
tive or judicial acts of another nation, having due regard both to international duty
and convenience and to the rights of its own citizens and of other persons under the
protection of its laws. Id. at 163-64.
In Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic v. Cibrario, 235 N.Y. 255, 258,
139 N.E. 259, 260 (1923) (per Andrews, J.), the New York Court of Appeals defined
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sire to maintain favorable relations with other nations 262 are
policy considerations that should not be overlooked by courts
in determining when to exercise jurisdiction over alien corpo-
rations.
In addition, enforcing judgments over non-domiciliaries
can be difficult. 263 A United States judgment against an alien
defendant may be enforced by attaching his assets in the
United States.264 However, when the defendant's only asset in
the United States is a subsidiary, there are few reasons265 for a
plaintiff to sue both the parent and the subsidiary because he
may recover the same amount no matter which party he
sues.2 66 When a judgment against an alien parent corporation
comity as "that reciprocal courtesy which one member of the family of nations owes
to the others .... Rules of comity are a portion of the law that [the courts] enforce."
The word "comity" has been used in the following senses in connection with
international law:
1) the rules of politeness, convenience and goodwill observed by nations
in their interactions, without being legally bound by them;
2) as an equivalent to private international law;
3) (misused) for the "company of nations mutually practicing international
comity;"
4) (misused) as an equivalent to international law.
1 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAw 34 n. 1 and accompanying text (H. Lauterpacht
8th ed. 1955).
262. Weintraub,Jurisdiction Over the Foreign Non-Sovereign Defendant, 19 SAN DIEGO
L. REV., 431, 436 (1982).
263. Note, supra note 256, at 655. Commentators disagree as to whether the
enforceability ofjudgments against alien defendants is a factor that should be consid-
ered when determining how far the jurisdiction of United States courts should ex-
tend. Id. Some courts believe that the possibility that the judgment may not be
enforced is not a sufficient basis to deny jurisdiction where it is otherwise valid. See
Duple Motor Bodies, Ltd. v. Hollingsworth, 417 F.2d 231, 236 (9th Cir. 1969); Engi-
neered Sports Products v. Brunswick Corp., 362 F. Supp. 722, 729 (D. Utah 1973).
264. See Weintraub, supra note 262, at 436.
265. A plaintiff may want to sue both a parent and subsidiary if he is seeking
recovery from an undercapitalized subsidiary and is afraid that ifjudgment is entered
only against the subsidiary, that he will not be able to collect. Undercapitalization is,
however, one of the factors courts examine under the alter-ego theory, so that juris-
diction over the parent in such a case may be achieved by piercing the corporate veil.
See supra note 12-13, 33-35 and accompanying text.
266. In a case in which the subsidiaries have no connection with the cause of
action, a plaintiff would have to sue the parent corporation to recover. See, e.g.,
Brunswick, 575 F. Supp. 1412. Jurisdiction over a parent corporation based solely on
the activities of an autonomous subsidiary, in relation to litigation that is uncon-
nected with the activities of the subsidiary, would seem to be of questionable consti-
tutional validity under Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977) and Helicopteros Na-
cionales de Colombia S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (1984). For a discussion of the appli-
cability of these decisions to Brunswick, see supra note 173 and accompanying text.
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is for an amount in excess of the defendant's total assets in the
United States, a plaintiff must attempt to get the United States
judgment recognized abroad. When jurisdiction has been
based on principles that are considered exorbitant by other na-
tions, the likelihood of recognition, enforcement, and recovery
is limited.26 7
The extension of jurisdiction over alien corporations
based on the activities of their subsidiaries will probably dis-
courage corporations from establishing subsidiaries in the
United States. Alien corporations may ship their goods to the
United States through independent distributors rather than
risk being subject to the rulings of United States courts
through the actions of their subsidiaries.2 68 Alternatively, an
alien corporation might decrease or forego business in the
United States. Important policy and commercial considera-
tions are involved in preventing or permitting businesses to
limit liability and exposure to governmental regulation. 269 To
a country engaged in world-wide trade and investment, these
considerations are particularly important.270 The choice be-
tween extending or limiting jurisdiction may lead to either en-
couragement or discouragement of investment.271 In addition,
the expansion of jurisdiction over alien corporations may lead
to reciprocal assertions of jurisdiction by other nations.2 72
267. Weintraub, supra note 262, at 436.
268. See Cannon Mfg. Co. v. Cudahy Packing Co., 267 U.S. at 336. Shipping
goods through an independent distributor would not necessarily make an alien cor-
poration immune to suit in the United States. For example the distributor could be
found to be the agent of the alien corporation. See, e.g., Continental Illinois Nat'l
Bank & Trust Co. of Chicago v. Protos Shipping, Inc., 472 F. Supp. 979, 983 (N.D.
Ill. 1979) (court held that it had jurisdiction over eight German shipowners because
of their commission of tortious acts through their local agent); Snyder v. Hampton
Indus., 521 F. Supp. 130, 142-43 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (court deemed the plaintiffs to be
the agents of the non-resident corporate defendant and therefore the court had juris-
diction over the defendant even though the plaintiffs were labeled independent con-
tractors). However, if the alien corporation did not own any property in the United
States, there would be no assets of the corporation to satisfy the judgment, forcing a
successful plaintiff to get the judgment recognized in a nation where the defendant
did have assets.
269. Frummer v. Hilton Hotel Int'l, 19 N.Y.2d 533, 540-41, 227 N.E.2d 851,
855, 281 N.Y.S.2d 41, 46-47 (Breitel,J., dissenting), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 923 (1967).
This proposition is especially true when the enterprises are truly separate corporate
entities. Id.
270. Id.
271. Id.
272. Id.
1986]
590 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LA WJOURNAL [Vol. 9:540
Commentators have raised strong arguments in support
of asserting United States jurisdiction over alien corporations
based on the activities of their United States subsidiaries.2 73
The most frequently mentioned arguments are the interests of
the forum state in reaching alien parent corporations 274 and
the interest of the plaintiff in litigating in the United States.275
A forum state has an interest in providing its residents
with effective forum of redress for injuries caused by non-resi-
dents.2 7 6 This interest may include protection from economic
as well as physical harm.2 7 7 However, although a forum state
has an interest in protecting its residents, this interest is lim-
ited by the due process protections of foreign and alien de-
fendants. 78
Similarly, a United States plaintiff has an interest in litigat-
ing its claim in the United States. 79 When an alien defendant
lacks direct contacts with a state in the United States, a plaintiff
may face a choice of either bringing an action in a foreign
country, or not at all.280 This may place great burdens on a
plaintiff.2 8 ' But although it may be unfair to force a plaintiff to
make this choice, the United States Supreme Court has clearly
held that the purpose of the minimum contacts test is to "pro-
273. See, e.g., Hay, The Interrelation of Jurisdiction and Choice-of-Law in United States
Conflicts Law, 28 INT'L & COMp. L.Q. 161, 175-76 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Hay,
Interrelation]; Hay Judicial Jurisdiction Over Foreign Country Corporate Defendants, 63 OR. L.
REV. 431, 453 (1984) [hereinafter cited as Hay, Judicial Jurisdiction]; Note, supra note
57, at 41-42; Note, supra note 4, at 759.
274. See, e.g., Hay,Judicial Jurisdiction, supra note 273, at 453; Note, supra note 57,
at 41-42; see also, McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957);
Copiers Typewriters Calculators, Inc. v. Toshiba Corp., 576 F. Supp. at 321 (in ad-
dressing reasonableness of exercising jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant
court must consider the interests of the forum state).
275. See, e.g., Hay,Judicial Jurisdiction, supra note 273, at 453; Note, supra note 4,
at 759. The right to trial by jury and liberal discovery rules are some examples of
procedural benefits of United States law that a plaintiff may desire to have at his
disposal. Hay, Judicial Jurisdiction, supra note 273, at 453.
276. See supra note 274.
277. Copiers, 576 F. Supp. at 321.
278. See World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson, 444 U.S. at 291 (citing Kulko v.
Superior Court of California, 436 U.S. at 91) (the due process clause of the four-
teenth amendment limits the power of a state court to render a valid personal judg-
ment against a nonresident defendant); International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326
U.S. 310 (1945); Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
279. See supra note 275.
280. Note, supra note 4, at 759.
281. Id.
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tect the defendant from the burden of litigating in a distant and
inconvenient forum.- 282
Apparently, no court has directly held that a plaintiff has a
constitutionally guaranteed right to litigate in a United States
court. Some commentators, however, have argued that a foot-
note in Shaffer v. Heitner283 supports the conclusion that a
United States plaintiff has this right.284 In Shaffer, the United
States Supreme Court suggested that a defendant's right to be
protected from the jurisdiction of those states with which he
does not have minimum contacts may have to yield to a plain-
tiff's absolute right to have a forum.285 Few courts, however,
have interpreted "a forum" to mean a United States forum,
because the Court did not qualify the term in that manner. 286
In addition, the Supreme Court's decision in Helicopteros Na-
cionales de Columbia, S.A. v. Hall negates such an inference. 28 7 In
Helicopteros, the Supreme Court strongly implied that any fo-
rum, even one outside of the United States, might satisfy the
plaintiff's right to have his case adjudicated.288
282. Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292 (emphasis added); see also, Phillips Petroleum
Co. v. Shutts, - U.S. at -, 105 S. Ct. at 2973 (the purpose of the minimum contacts
test is to protect the defendant from the travail of defending in a distant forum unless
his contacts make it just to force him to defend there). If the burdens on the plaintiff
are too great, he can decide not to sue, or to sue elsewhere. Insurance Co. of N. Am.
v. Marina Salina Cruz, 649 F.2d 1266, 1273 (9th Cir. 1981). A defendant has no such
"luxury." Id.
283. 433 U.S. 186, 211 n.37 (1977). The Supreme Court in this footnote stated
that "[t]his case does not raise, and we do not therefore consider, the question of
whether the presence of a defendant's property in a state is a sufficient basis for
jurisdiction when no other forum is available to the plaintiff." Id.
284. See Hay,Judicial Jurisdiction, supra note 273, at 446-47. While Professor Hay
believes that there are good policy reasons why a local forum should be available to a
United States plaintiff when an alien defendant has some contact with the United
States, he admits that these policy reasons alone do not make such an exercise of
jurisdiction constitutional. Id. at 453; see also, Note, supra note 4, at 759. That Note
argued that the facts of each case should be considered in deciding whether or not
the plaintiff practically has the ability to sue in another country, including the mone-
tary and other resources available to each party. Id. at 760.
285. Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 211 n.37; see supra note 283.
286. The court in American Land Program, Inc. v. Bonadventura Uitgevers
Maatschappij, N.V., 710 F.2d 1449, 1453 (10th Cir. 1983) appears to have adopted
this reasoning in dicta. See Hay,Judicial Jurisdiction, supra note 273, at 447.
287. 466 U.S. 408, 419 n.13 (1984).
288. Id. The plaintiff, in Helicopteros, had suggested that, as an alternative to the
traditional minimum contacts analysis, the Court should hold that the State of Texas
had personal jurisdiction over the defendant Helicopteros under the doctrine of"ju-
risdiction by necessity." Id. (citing Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 211 n.37). The Court declined
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Policies that favor international trade and economic
growth in the United States will be best served by curtailing
the extension ofjurisdiction over alien corporations that have
no direct contact with a forum state.289 By exercising jurisdic-
tion over alien corporations based on the activities of their
United States subsidiaries, United States courts will most likely
discourage the incorporation of subsidiaries and increase the
costs of exporting to the United States.290
B. Recommendations
United States courts should adopt a uniform approach to
asserting jurisdiction over alien corporations whose only con-
tacts with the forum are through United States subsidiaries.
The courts should follow the traditional approach of exercis-
ing jurisdiction over a foreign or alien parent corporation only
when the court finds that the subsidiary is acting as an agent
for the parent or that the subsidiary is a mere division of the
parent under the alter-ego doctrine. 29' This approach is pref-
erable because it would encourage alien corporations to incor-
porate subsidiaries in the United States. In addition, the tradi-
tional approach is preferable because it is consistent with the
doctrine of corporate separateness 292 as endorsed by the
Supreme Court in Cannon Manufacturing Co. v. Cudahy Packing
Co. 293
An alternate approach would be for the United States
Congress to enact legislation to clarify the current confusion
regarding jurisdiction over alien corporations that have incor-
porated subsidiaries in the United States.294 Such legislation
could specifically state that the incorporation of a subsidiary in
to consider the adoption of this doctrine, however, stating that the plaintiffs had
failed to carry their burden of showing that all three defendants could not be sued
together in a single forum. Id. Significantly, the Court stated that "[i]t is not clear
from the record ... whether suit could have been brought against all three defend-
ants in either Colombia or Peru." Id. (emphasis added).
289. See Samuels v. B.M.W. of N.A., Inc., 554 F. Supp. at 1194.
290. See id., at 1195. This increase will probably be reflected in the price con-
sumers have to pay for foreign goods and the balance of trade.
291. See supra notes 10-13, 33-35 and accompanying text.
292. See supra notes 26-37 and accompanying text.
293. 267 U.S. 333 (1925). For a discussion of the Cannon doctrine, see supra
notes 38-47 and accompanying text.
294. Cf. Cannon, 267 U.S. at 336. The Court, in Cannon, stated that "Congress
has not provided that a corporation of one State shall be amenable to suit in the
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a particular state gives that state, and any other state in which
the subsidiary does business, jurisdiction over the parent cor-
poration.295 At least, this procedure would afford potential de-
fendants the predictability that the due process clause was in-
tended to provide.296
Finally, the United States Senate should ratify recognition
and enforcement of judgment treaties, such as the United
States-United Kingdom Convention. Equally important, the
United States Senate should ratify treaties addressing the ac-
tual exercise of jurisdiction 297 to clarify that jurisdiction over
an alien corporation cannot be based solely on the presence or
activities of its United States subsidiary corporation.29 8
CONCLUSION
A subsidiary corporation is a legal entity separate from its
shareholders, notwithstanding that its principal shareholder is
another corporation.2 99 The dual personality of a parent and
its subsidiary should not be lightly disregarded.3 0 0 Under the
traditional rule, as adopted by the United States Supreme
Court in Cannon Manufacturing Co. v. Cudahy Packing Co. ,3"' a
court does not have jurisdiction over a parent merely because
its subsidiary is incorporated or doing business in the forum
state. 2 Only when a subsidiary is acting as an agent of its
parent, or when the parent so controls and dominates the sub-
sidiary that at the latter's independent corporate status is a fic-
tion, 03 will a court have jurisdiction over the parent based on
the actions of its subsidiary.
federal court for another State in which the plaintiff resides, whenever it employs a
subsidiary corporation as the instrumentality for doing business therein." Id.
295. Such legislation could be enacted at either a federal level or state level.
Leaving such legislation to individual states, however, would likely result in contin-
ued inconsistencies under United States law.
296. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, - U.S. at -, 105 S. Ct. at 2182 (citing
Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297).
297. An example of such a treaty is the Brussels Convention, supra note 208.
298. The treaty approach is preferable to a case law or statutory approach to
jurisdiction over alien corporations, since a treaty would guarantee that the stated
grounds for jurisdiction are mutually respected and agreed upon on both sides.
299. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
300. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
301. 267 U.S. 333 (1925).
302. See supra notes 38-47 and accompanying text.
303. See supra notes 7-11, 33-34 and accompanying text.
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Although some United States courts follow the traditional
rule, others have exercised jurisdiction over alien corporations
based on the activities of their subsidiaries absent a finding of
an agency or alter-ego relationship.3 °4 The United States case
law has been inconsistent on this issue, thereby failing to pro-
vide defendants with the predictability of the legal system that
the due process clause was intended to afford.30 5
Like traditional United States law, the law of the United
Kingdom favors the theory of legal separation between a cor-
poration and its shareholders. 0 6 United Kingdom courts ap-
ply the theory of corporate separateness between a parent and
its subsidiary, unless the court finds the existence of an agency
relationship or abuse of the corporate form. 0 7 This approach
is reflected in the United States-United Kingdom Convention
on the Reciprocal Recognition & Enforcement ofJudgments in
Civil Matters.30 8 The Convention specifically excludes the rec-
ognition of a judgment in which jurisdiction over a parent cor-
poration was based solely on the activities of its subsidiary in
the forum. 0 9
United States courts should adopt a uniform approach for
exercising jurisdiction over an alien corporation whose only
contact with the forum is through its subsidiary. The courts
should follow the traditional rule of exercising jurisdiction
over an alien parent corporation only when the court finds the
existence of an agency or alter-ego relationship between the
parent and the subsidiary. 1 0 In addition, the United States
Senate should ratify recognition and enforcement ofjudgment
treaties, such as the United States-United Kingdom Conven-
tion, and clarify the basis forjurisdiction over an alien corpora-
tion, which cannot be based solely on the presence or activities
304. See, e.g., Weight v. Kawasaki Motors Corp., USA, 604 F. Supp. 968 (E.D.
Va. 1985) (discussed supra notes 113-25 and accompanying text); Brunswick Corp. v.
Suzuki Motors Co., 575 F. Supp. 1412 (E.D. Wis. 1983) (discussed supra notes 165-73
and accompanying text); Graco, Inc. v. Kremlin, Inc., 558 F. Supp. 188 (N.D. Ill.
1982) (discussed supra note 154-64 and accompanying text).
305. See Burger King, - U.S. at -, 105 S. Ct. at 2182.
306. See supra notes 218-21 and accompanying text.
307. See supra notes 222-26 and accompanying text.
308. U.S.-U.K. Convention, supra note 23.
309. See supra note 236 and accompanying text.
310. See supra note 291 and accompanying text.
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of its United States subsidiary. 1 1
Juliet Sarkessian
311. See supra notes 297-98 and accompanying text.
